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The Swiss Securities Exchange Act and Investment
Fund Act: A New Regulatory Framework for
the Swiss Capital Markets
Thomas P. Bischoft
I. Introduction
The regulatory and market environment of the Swiss capital mar-
kets will undergo important changes in 1995. On the regulatory side, a
Federal Securities Exchanges and Securities Trading Act (Securities
Exchange Act, or SEA) 1 has passed the Senate (Conseil des I9tats) in its
fall 1994 session 2 and the House of Representatives (Conseil National)
in its spring 1995 session 3 for the final second reading. The Houses of
Parliament have reached agreement on all issues, and the last textual
differences have been cleared. 4 The SEA is expected to become effec-
tive in spring, 1996. In addition, Parliament has already enacted a
completely overhauled Investment Fund Act (IFA), which has been ef-
fective since January 1, 1995.5 On the market side, globalization of the
financial markets and their participants has forced the existing three
stock exchanges of Zurich, Geneva, and Basle to merge into a single
t Lic. iur. St. Gall University, 1985; LL.M. Harvard Law School, 1989; Attorney, Froriep
Renggli & Partners, Geneva/Zurich.
1 Loi fMdrale sur les bourses et le commerce des valeurs mobili~res (Loi sur les
bourses, LBYM) of 24 March 1995. See RECUEIL OFFICIEL DES LOIS FtDtRALFS 1995, 400-16
[hereinafter ROLF] (ROLF, the official record of the federal laws of Switzerland, is issued in
chronological order); Botschaft zu einem Bundesgesetz ueber die Boersen und den Ef-
fektenhondel (Boersengesetz, BEHG). See also Message concernant une loi fRd&ale sur les
bourses et le commerce des valeurs mobili~res du 24 f6vrier 1993 [Explanatory Report of the
Federal Government on the SEA, February 24, 1993], FF 11269 (1993) [hereinafter Explana-
tory Report].
2 For a discussion of the hearings of the Senate on September 21, 1994, see Amtliches
Bulletin der Bundesversammlung, Staenderat III 837-39 (1994).
3 For a discussion of the hearings of the House of Representatives on March 14, 1994,
7th Sess., see Amtliches Bulletin der Bundesversammlung, Nationalrat, Doc. No. 93.025 (pro-
visional draft issue).
4 All references made to the draft law refer to the text as passed by the Senate in its
second reading, as amended and modified by the House of Representatives in its spring 1995
session. On March 21, 1995, the Senate cleared any textual differences by adopting the final
textual modifications made by the House of Representatives. For the Report of the Senate's
session, see Neue Zuercher Zeitung, No. 68, Mar. 2, 1995, at 17.
5 Loi f6d6rale sur les fonds de placement [Investment Fund Act of March 18, 1994], FF
11303 (1994) [hereinafter IFA]. See ROLF 1994, 2523; see also Message concernant la revision
de la loi fidrale sur les fonds de placement [Explanatory Report on the Investment Fund
Act], FF 11 189 (1993) [hereinafter IFA Explanatory Report].
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national exchange, the Swiss electronic stock exchange (Elektronische
Boerse Schweiz, or EBS). EBS is supported and owned by the recently
incorporated Swiss Stock Exchange Association (SSE).6 Migration
from ring to electronic trading is expected to start on June 2, 1995,
and full operation is scheduled for July 28, 1995.7 Technically, this
system will allow incorporation of SOFFEX trading which will be
phased in at a second stage.8 As the new SEA will most likely not be
effective when the EBS becomes operative, the supervisory authorities
of the Canton of Zurich, which under present law is responsible for the
Zurich stock exchange, will assume the task of supervisory authority
over the EBS until the SEA becomes effective. 9
In contrast to the legal environment in the United States, regula-
tion of stock exchanges has been the province of the Cantons (States)
in Switzerland, whereas company law was unified long ago on the fed-
eral level. The cantonal stock exchange laws will now be superseded by
the SEA, which will provide basic federal authority for regulation, li-
censing, and supervision of securities exchanges and broker-dealers. 10
The SEA also provides for disclosure of major shareholdings in listed
companies and contains regulations on tender offers (takeovers).1 1 As
a novelty on the European Continent, the SEA introduces an obliga-
tion to make an offer to purchase all outstanding voting capital once a
certain threshold of control has been passed.1 2 However, the SEA will
only cover the secondary markets, i.e. securities trading on or off ex-
change (over-the-counter) subsequent to original issuance as well as
secondary "grey markets."1 3 At present, primary markets are regulated
6 The SSE was incorporated on May 26, 1993. HANDBUCH DER SCHWEIZ, ZULASSUNGS-
STELLE, sec. I (1993). Its founding members include the stock exchanges of Zurich, Basle,
and Geneva. Id. Legally, it is an association formed under Article 60 of the Swiss Civil Code.
See id. at art. I, Articles of Association. Its articles of association are published in the hand-
book issued by the Zurich Stock Exchange. See Effektenboersenverein Zurich, Handbuch der
Zuercher Boerse (1994).
7 Initially, migration was planned to begin on March 24, 1995, and full operation to
begin in May 1995. See Neue Zuercher Zeitung, No. 169, July 22, 1994, at 27. However, for
technical reasons, several weeks of delay have occurred. 11L An initial trial will be held on
May 6, 1995, in which more than 1,100 EBS-traders will participate. See NEUE ZUERCHER
ZEITUNG, No. 22, Jan. 27, 1995, at 23. See generally EBS-The Future of the Stock Exchange
in Switzerland 11-20 (Association Tripartites Bourses ed., 1993), for a discussion of the com-
plicated migration and transformation procedure.
8 SOFFEX, the Swiss Options and Financial Futures Exchange, is incorporated as a
Swiss limited liability company. It is wholly owned by the SSE. See 1993 Soffex Ann. Rep. 5.
The rules and regulations of SOFFEX are set out in its manual which is periodically updated.
See SOFFEX, RULES AND REGULATIONS (Jan. ed. 1994).
9 See Neue Zuercher Zeitung, No. 22, Jan. 22, 1995, at 22.
10 See infra part II.
11 See infra part III.B.
12 See infra part III.B.3.
13 The boundaries between primary and secondary markets have become blurred, as
new issues may be traded on the exchange even before the end of the subscription period.
As a result of the practice on the Euromarket today, most of the new issues in Switzerland are
traded on the grey market. See gneralyJEAN-BAPTISTE ZUFFREY, LA RtGLEMENTATION DES sys-
TtMES SUR LES MARCHES FINANCIERS SECONDAIRES 263 (1994). According to the Explanatory
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to a certain extent by the Code of Obligations (Code, or C),14 the Fed-
eral Banking Act (FBA), 1 5 the Federal Banking Ordinance (FBO) t 6
and its rules and regulations as promulgated by the Federal Banking
Commission (FBC), the National Bank Act, and the rules and regula-
tions of the Swiss National Bank.17 The Code of Obligations has re-
cently been modified by additional disclosure and auditing
Report, the SEA clearly extends to the grey market. See Explanatory Report, supra note 1, at
1284.
14 Of particular concern is the requirement of the issuance of a prospectus where the
subscription of shares or bonds is being offered to the public. BUNDESGESETZ BETREFFEND DIE
ERGANZUNG DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN ZIVILGESETZBUCHES [CODE OF OBLIGATIONS, Co] arts. 652a,
1156-86. The provisions relating to the public issue of bonds are not very detailed. Id. The
requirement of the Code for publishing a prospectus must be distinguished from the estab-
lishment of a prospectus for purposes of listing the securities, as set forth by the new SEA. See
infra part IV. For a discussion of the current requirements of the Code of Obligations, see
generally CHRISTIAN A. CAMENZIND, PROSPEKTZWANG UND PROSPEKTHAFFUNG BEI OEFFEN-
TLICHEN ANLEIHENSOBLIGATIONEN UND NOTES 50-64, 80-125 (1989); Rolf Watter, Pros-
pekt(haft)pflicht heute und morgen, 1992 PRATIQUE JURIDIQUE ACTUELLE (PJA) 48; DANIEL
DAENIKER, ANLEGERSCHUTZ BEI OBLIGATIONENANLEIHEN 14-15 (1992). Furthermore, it should
be noted that with respect to the issue of equity, the Code's provisions only apply to Swiss
-companies that are incorporated in Switzerland, not to public issues of shares of foreign
companies. See PETER FORSTMOSER, SCHWEIZERRISCHES AXTIENRECHT 267 (1981). The Code's
provisions governing the public issue of bonds and debt obligations, however, apply to issues
of both domestic and foreign companies. See ANDRF.AS ROHR, GRUNDZUEGE DES EMISSION-
SRECHTS 191 (1990).
15 Loi fdrale sur les banques et les caisses d'6pargne [Federal Banking and Savings
Bank Act of November 8, 1934], RS 952.0 [hereinafter FBA]. The FBA has recently been
amended. See FBC Bulletin, No. 24, 1994; see also ROLF 1995, I 246. Swiss banks act as
universal banks; that is, they may engage in both commercial and investment banking activi-
ties. See FBA, at art. 1 (large definition of banking activities); see also URs EMCH ET AL., DAS
SCHWEIZERISCHE BANKGESCHAEFT 22 (4th ed. 1993). Banks that are licensed under the FBA,
therefore, hold the biggest share in the Swiss primary markets. Explanatory Report, supra
note 1, at 1283. Thus, banking regulations affect both the primary and secondary markets.
The regulations applicable to licensing of banks, banking supervision, minimum capital,
own-fund requirements, and accounting and auditing are thought to provide creditor protec-
tion and indirect protection of investors. See generally THOMAS WERLEN, KONZEPTIONELI.E
GRUNDLAGEN DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN KAPITALMARKFRECHTS 112-13, 125-26 (1994). In addition,
Art. 8 of the FBA, amended as of January 1, 1995, empowers the federal government to
subject capital export (public debt issues by foreign issuers) to regulation if exceptional cir-
cumstances so require. FBA, supra, RS 902.0, at art. 8. Such measures would be taken only in
emergency situations. The former requirement of general authorization of Swiss-franc issues
by foreign debtors has been abolished and has been replaced by an obligation to notify for
statistical purposes any public issue of debt obligations (i.e., by domestic and foreign debt-
ors). This obligation was introduced by the Swiss National Bank pursuant to its powers under
Art. 7(5) of the FBA, amended as of January 1, 1995. See Circular of the Swiss National Bank,
Jan. 10, 1995 (effective Feb. 1, 1995). The requirement that the lead manager of a Swiss-
franc denominated issue must be a Swiss bank as defined in the FBA is still effective. See FBC
BULLETIN, No. 3, 1994.
16 Ordonnance de la CFB sur les banques et les caisses d' 6pargne [Implementing Ordi-
nance of Federal Banking and Savings Bank Act of May 17, 1972], RS 952.02 [hereinafter
FBO], modified as of December 12, 1994, see ROLF I at 253 (1995). The FBO's provisions
with respect to accounting and auditing also have been amended recently. See FBC Bulletin
No. 26 (1995).
17 See Loi sur la Banque nationale [National Bank Act of December 23, 1953]
(amended on Dec. 15, 1978), RS 951.1 (of specific importance are arts. 16g & 16h which
relate to control of issues to regulate interest rates; at present, no such regulations have been
issued). See generally ANDREAS ROHR, supra note 14 at 78-92 (1990).
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requirements for listed companies. The revised Code also narrowed
the availability of transfer restrictions for shares in such companies. 18
The SEA will only provide the regulatory framework, thus requir-
ing that broad rule-making and discretionary powers be delegated to
the Federal Government and the FBC. The FBC will also act as super-
visory authority. The underlying reasoning is that only the supervisory
bodies, not the legislature, are able to respond quickly to market devel-
opments. Those rule-making and discretionary powers should facili-
tate efficient surveillance and regulation in view of the Act's purposes
of guaranteeing fair, honest, and transparent markets and maintaining
public trust and confidence in the integrity of the marketplace.19 A
major theme in this context is self-regulation by the market participants
under the general aegis of the FBC. 20 Compared with the Govern-
ment's draft version, the Houses of Parliament have considerably
strengthened the principle of self-regulation and limited the Govern-
ment's rule-making power.
The Exchanges will be free to choose their structure and form of
trading and will have the power to issue rules for membership and
listing of securities. The SSE's admission board (Swiss Office for the
Admission of Securities, or SOAS) 21 is currently promulgating new list-
ing rules, which will have to be submitted to the FBC within three
months after the SEA becomes effective.22
The legislature applied a similar technique when it enacted the
IFA, which provides the regulatory framework for Swiss and foreign
investment funds and the marketing of units of such funds in Switzer-
land. The general regulations set out in the IFA are complemented by
more detailed rules in the underlying Ordinance. The Ordinance pro-
vides, inter alia, detailed requirements for the formation and manage-
ment of funds, the conditions which license applicants (such as fund
managers, custodian or depositary banks, distributors, and auditors)
must meet, detailed provisions that define the permitted investments
and set out the investment restrictions for each fund category, and pro-
visions relating to reporting, publication, valuation, and accounting. 23
The regulations on accounting and auditing are further detailed in a
18 See infra part IIIA.
19 The Government's draft proposal listed both protection of investors and a guarantee
of fair and efficient markets as purposes of the Act. See Explanatory Report, supra note 1, at
1381-82. Since investors are best protected by fair, efficient and transparent markets, Parlia-
ment has eliminated the former as a primary purpose of the Act. See also WERLEN, supra note
15, at 193-213 (1994).
20 See SEA, supra note 1, at art. 32; FBA, supra note 15, at art. 23.
21 Swiss Office for the Admission of Securities [hereinafter SAB].
22 See SEA, supra note 1, at art. 49. The FBC will have to render its decision within one
year after the implementation of the SEA. See generally infra part IV.
23 Ordonnance sur les fonds de placement [Ordinance on the Investment Fund Act of
October 23, 1994], ROLF 1994, 2547 [hereinafter Ordinance I]. For a discussion of the IFA,
see generaly infra part V.
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separate Ordinance issued by the FBC.24
In Part II, an overview of the new Securities Exchange Act in its
draft form and a discussion of its Sections I to III relating to stock
exchanges and broker-dealers will be presented. Part III outlines Sec-
tions IV and V of the SEA that encompass the regulations governing
disclosure of major holdings and takeovers. In Part IV, the draft pro-
posals ofthe Swiss Admission Board (SAB) that concern new rules for
the listing of securities shall be discussed. Finally, Part V is dedicated
to the new Investment Fund Act and the marketing of units or shares
of foreign schemes in Switzerland.
II. The Securities Exchange Act of Switzerland
A. Applicable Definitions
The scope of the SEA is determined by the definitions of securities,
stock exchanges, and broker-dealers.25 Securities are very broadly defined
under the U.S. Securities Act of 1933.26 Via the test enunciated by the
Supreme Court of the United States in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 2 7 securi-
ties include virtually all investment contracts (such as notes and com-
modities, and even managed brokerage accounts according to some
courts),28 except those made for commercial or banking purposes.29
Similarly, the U.K Financial Services Act of 1986 contains an extensive
and rather complicated definition of investments.3 0 In contrast, the
SEA defines securities rather briefly as any standardized, fungible, and
negotiable rights or instruments, whether or not embodied in a docu-
ment, that are designed for mass trading.31 Thus, the definition in-
cludes, apart from traditional investment vehicles, futures, options,
and other derivatives (except derivatives traded on the OTC market),
24 Ordonnance de la CFB sur les fonds de placement [Ordinance of the FBC on the
Investment Fund Act of October 27, 1994], ROLF 1994, 3125 [hereinafter FBC Ordinance].
25 See SEA, supra note 1, at art. 2.
26 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1988). See also 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1988).
27 SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99, 301 (1946).
28 Whether a brokerage account comes under the definition depends on whether there
is a common enterprise and whether the broker provides a service rather than an investment
contract. See THoMAs L HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION sec. 1.5 (2d ed. 1990 &
Supp. 1994). However, courts are split over this issue. See, e.g., SEC v. Continental Commodi-
ties Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974); see also, e.g., Lewis Lowenfels & Alan Bromberg, What
Is a Security Under the Federal Securities Laws?, 56 ALB. L. REv. 473 (1993). Contra Mordaunt v.
Incomco, 686 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1982).
29 Under the Howey test, it is crucial whether the investor expects profits solely from the
efforts of others. w.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. at 298-99. The requirement that profits be secured
solely from the efforts of others has been diluted subsequently to the requirement that prof-
its come primarily or substantially from others. See THOMAS L. HAZEN, supra note 28 § 1.5 (2d
ed. 1990 & Supp. 1994). For a recent definition of notes as securities, see Reves v. Ernst &
Young, 494 U.S. 56, 63-65 (1990) (holding that a presumption arises that a note is a security).
See alsoJanet Kerr & Karen M. Eisenhauer, Reves Revisited, PEPP. L. REv. 1123 (1992).
30 See Financial Services Act of 1986, part I, sec. 1(1) & Schedule 1 (U.K). See also, e.g.,
ROBERT R. PENNIN TON, THE LAW OF THE INvEsTMENT MARKETs 57-61 (1990).
31 See SEA, supra note 1, at art. 2(a).
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but not the underlying foreign exchange, precious metals, or
commodities. 32
An exchange is defined as any institution or organized marketplace
the purpose of which is serving as a platform for the trading (which, in
SEA terms, is the simultaneous exchange of offer and demand) of se-
curities among broker-dealers and the settlement of such trades. 33
The Government may extend the Act to any exchange-like institution,
such as telephonic trading systems, or may exempt exchanges or ex-
change-like institutions if the purposes of the Act do not mandate
regulation.3 4
A broker-dealer is defined as (i) any individual, partnership, or legal
person; (ii) who is professionally 35 engaged in the business of effecting
securities transactions on the secondary markets for the account of
others or for his own account in view of resale within a short term; and
(iii) who publicly offers the subscription of securities on the primary
market, or issues itself and publicly offers derivatives for sale. 36 This
definition includes dealers and any professionals who act as principals,
such as arbitrageurs, specialists, and market makers. In contrast, the
EC Investment Services Directive (ISD) 3 7 applies principally to legal
persons who render investment services for third parties. 38 However, if
an investment firm is subject to the ISD under this definition, its pro-
prietary trading is also considered an investment service in terms of
and subject to regulation under the Directive.3 9 Unlike the ISD, 40 the
SEA does not apply to discretionary portfolio management exercised
on a client-by-client basis; but, it does extend to management of
32 See Explanatory Report, supra note 1, at 1296. Derivatives traded over the counter
(OTC Market) are not standardized, but shaped according to the client's specific needs.
They are thus not securities in terms of the Act. This follows from the author's interpretation
of art. 2(a) SEA and the Explanatory Report, id. 1295.
33 See SEA, supra note 1, at art. 2(b). The definition must be understood in a technical
sense; that is, the question is whether there is an organized market with some type of trading
infrastructure. See Explanatory Report, supra note 1, at 1296.
34 See SEA, supra note 1, at art. 3(5). In particular, the SEA might apply to electronic
trade confirmation systems (ETC), under which a broker enters the terms and data of a trade
into the electronic system for automatic approval or dismissal by the client. See also Explana-
tory Report, supra note 1, at 1399. TRAX, SEQUEL, and OASIS GLOBAL, which soon will
be bridged among each other, are examples of electronic trade confirmation systems. See
NEUE ZUERCHER ZErrUNG, No. 236, Oct. 19, 1994, at 13. The globalization of those systems
and the markets in general will require greater international co-operation among regulators.
35 For a definition of professional commercial activity, see Article 52 Ordonnance sur le
registre du Commerce [Federal Ordinance on the Commercial Register of June 7, 1937], RS
221.441.
36 See SEA, supra note 1, at art. 2(c).
37 Council Directive 93/22 of May 10, 1993 on Investment Services in the Securities
Field, 1993 O.J. (L 141) 27 [hereinafter ISD].
38 See id. at art. 1(3).
39 See id. at art. 1(2), annex A(2) & B.
40 See id. at annex A(3). See also, e.g., Pauline Ashall, The Investment Services Directive: What
Was the Conflict All About?, in E.C. Financial Market Regulation and Company Law 91, 94
(Mads Andenas & Stephen Kenyon-Slade eds., 1993).
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pooled funds. 4' Both the SEA and ISD cover marketing of investment
fund units by intermediaries, except that the ISD does not apply to
units issued by schemes which are not UCITS in terms of the EC
UCITS Directive. 42 Finally, the SEA definition of broker-dealer also
encompasses non-bank investment banks, investment firms, and invest-
ment houses or distributors who underwrite and/or place issues. 43
The SEA will apply to all broker-dealers, irrespective of whether
they have direct access to a stock exchange or whether they act only
indirectly through an institution admitted at an exchange. In addi-
tion, the Government may subject professional proprietary traders
(such as institutional investors or multinational companies), which
trade directly off exchange without relying on a broker-dealer, to cer-
tain reporting requirements. 44 The ISD, on the other hand, does not
apply to such traders.45 However, institutional investors who profes-
sionally trade through broker-dealers for long-term investment pur-
poses only (such as pension funds or multinational companies) do not
qualify as broker-dealers under the SEA. Given these rather general
distinctions, much will depend on further detailing by the Government
in its Ordinance.
B. Securities Exchanges
Any exchange will need a license from the supervisory authority.
This license will be granted if: (i) the exchange's organization and its
rules and regulations warrant compliance with the Act; (ii) its execu-
tives and employees' professional qualification and integrity warrant
compliance with the Act and the rules and regulations of both their
professional organization and the exchange; and (iii) its executives
and executive branches meet the minimum requirements which the
Government may enact by way of ordinance. 46 Applicants who meet
these requirements have a vested right to obtain a license. Members of
41 See Explanatory Report, supra note 1, at 1297.
42 For a discussion of the UCITS Directive, see infra part V.A.
43 The FBO had been extended to such institutions in 1989. See FBO, supra note 16, at
art. 2(c). As these firms will be subject to the SEA, it is expected that this provision will be
repealed after the effective date of the SEA. See Explanatory Report, supra note 1, at 1298.
44 These reporting requirements will only be defined in the Ordinance. See SEA, supra
note 1, at art. 15(2)k(4). If such companies or institutions are subject to the SEA, approved
auditors will be necessary to examine the company's compliance with its reporting obliga-
tion, and such companies will have a duty to disclose such information upon request to the
FBC. See SEA, supra note 1, at art. 15(4).
45 See ISD, supra note 37, at art. 2(2) (listing, inter alia, (i) insurance companies, (ii)
firms which provide investment services exclusively for their parent undertakings, for their
subsidiaries or for other subsidiaries of their parent undertakings, (iii) firms that provide
investment services consisting exclusively in the administration of employee-participation
schemes, (iv) collective investment undertakings, and (v) persons whose main business is
trading in commodities amongst themselves or with producers or professional users of such
products).
46 See SEA, supra note 1, at art. 3(a)-(c).
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an exchange do not need to be licensed broker-dealers. 47 The SEA
neither provides for a stock exchange monopoly nor requires the mar-
ket participants to trade over an exchange. It does not limit the
number of exchanges and expressly mentions licensing of foreign ex-
changes, which licensing may, however, be conditioned on reciprocity.
Special rules will be drafted by the Government for admission of for-
eign exchanges without registered offices or physical installations in
Switzerland, such as foreign electronic or telephonic trading systems. 48
Thus, this intention to regulate cross-border trading will necessitate
cooperation with foreign supervisory authorities. 49
According to the principle of self-regulation, the SEA only re-
quires that an exchange have an operational, administrative and mana-
gerial structure and organization which match its size and objectives
and that the exchange provides for adequate self-regulatory control
mechanisms for its operations and the supervision of its members.
These structures, rules, and self-regulatory mechanisms must be sub-
mitted to the FBC for examination and approval. The SEA allows the
exchanges to choose freely their trading system and simply requires
that it be transparent and efficient. To this end, the SEA imposes a
number of recording, reporting, and publication requirements. 50 Se-
47 Article 7(2) of the Government's draft provided that only licensed broker-dealers
could be members of an Exchange. Parliament eliminated this requirement.
48 See SEA, supra note 1, at arts. 3(4), 35. For example, the International Securities
Markets Association (ISMA) has been given the status of a Designated Investment Exchange
as defined by Section 36 of the UK Financial Services Act of 1986. ISMA is a self-regulatory
association for the international securities markets, particularly Eurobond markets, with its
seat in Switzerland. See A PROFILE FOR THE FuTuRE 10-11 (ISMA ed. 1992). Its operative arm
is the London based ISMA Ltd., which has developed a real time trade confirmation, affirma-
tion, risk management and regulatory reporting system (TRAX). See supra note 34. Thus, if
the Government decided to extend the SEA to exchange-like institutions, ISMA Ltd. would
be a candidate for licensing of a foreign exchange pursuant to Article 3(4) of the SEA.
49 The SEA also contains a section pertaining to assistance given to foreign authorities
by the FBC. Compared to the Government's proposal, Parliament has further limited the
FBC's power to grant such assistance to foreign authorities. Accordingly, information may
only be provided if: (i) it is directly necessary for the supervision of foreign broker-dealers in
theirjurisdiction; (ii) the foreign authority is bound by local law to secrecy in its office and to
professional secrecy; (iii) the foreign authority agrees not to disclose the information to
other authorities without prior consent of the FBC, unless a treaty or agreement between
Switzerland and the foreign country generally provides for such disclosure; and (iv) no infor-
mation may be provided to foreign criminal investigative authorities if such information
could not be disclosed pursuant to the laws and treaties providing for legal assistance in
criminal matters. See SEA, supra note 1, at art. 36. Finally, no information may be forwarded
where, upon a prima facie showing, a person is not involved in the matter under investiga-
tion. See id. at art. 36 (as passed by both Houses of Parliament). Switzerland and the United
States have, in the. framework of the treaty on mutual assistance in criminal matters, entered
into an agreement pursuant to which Switzerland will.also grant assistance in ancillary admin-
istrative proceedings relating to the offer, sale, and purchase of securities, derivatives, and
commodities. Echange de lettres du 3 novembre 1993 entre la Suisse et les Etats-Unis [Ex-
change of Diplomatic Letters], Nov. 3, 1993, RS 0.351.933.66. The granting of assistance has
thus been extended to proceedings of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. See id.
50 See SEA, supra note 1, at arts. 4-6. In particular, an exchange must provide for a
system for chronological recording of all transactions. Accordingly, prices, volume of trading
and other price-related information must be published regularly.
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curities and price lists must contain a separate section for companies
which are not subject to the takeover provisions of the Act or which
have 'increased the threshold for that purpose above 331/s%.51 The
supervision of day-to-day operations is placed in the sole responsibility
of the exchange. It must notify the FBC of any potential breach of the
law, rules, or regulations, which may then give rise to an investiga-
tion.52 An exchange must also set out its rules for membership, which
must not be discriminatory. 53 It has to submit rules for the listing of
securities, delisting, and suspension of trade, which rules by law must
satisfy internationally accepted standards. 54 The decisions on admis-
sion or exclusion of membership and listing of securities, respectively,
may be appealed to an independent review board which every ex-
change must establish. The board's decisions are subject to judicial
review by the ordinary civil courts.55
The Government's proposal to empower exchanges to oblige
their members to trade exclusively over their systems has been struck
by Parliament. Reportedly, the SSE will, however, oblige its EBS mem-
bers on a private law basis to effect trades of up to Sfr. 200,000 (US$
150,000) for shares and other equity instruments and Sfr. 100,000
(US$ 75,000) for debt instruments through EBS. Traditionally, the
over-the-counter (OTC) market has been of great importance in Swit-
zerland. Market transparency will considerably depend on the extent
to which and how the reporting systems of the exchanges will account
for these trades.
C. Broker-Dealers
A broker-dealer will need authorization, whether or not he has a
seat on an exchange.56 The grant of a license will be conditioned on
51 See infra part III.B.3.
52 See SEA, supra note 1, at art. 6. These market control mechanisms must be fashioned
in such a manner as to allow for efficient investigation into cases of insider dealing, unlawful
price manipulation, and other breaches of the law.
53 An exchange may, however, establish different categories of membership which de-
pend upon the role and function of the member. See Explanatory Report, supra note 1, at
1302. SOFFEX, for example, grants exchange licenses and clearing licenses which are di-
vided into sub-categories. See SOFFEX, General Rules and Regulations, Rule 1.2.1-1.2.8
(1992).
54 See SEA, supra note 1, at art. 8. The reference to international standards particularly
concerns rules of disclosure and publication of information. It may be expected that the
SOAS will borrow substantially from the EC Admissions Directive when enacting its admis-
sion (listing) rules. See Council Directive 79/279 of March 5, 1979 Coordinating the Condi-
tions for Admission of Securities to Official Stock Exchange Listing, 1979 OJ. (L 66) 21
[hereinafter Admissions Directive]. See infra part IV.
55 See SEA, supra note 1, at art. 9.
56 Whereas broker-dealers obtain a single or unitary license, licenses are accorded for
specific services under the ISD. See ISD, supra note 37, at art. 3. For a comparison of the
conditions under the SEA and the ISD, see Rolf Watter, Wertpapierfirmen und
Wertpapierdienstleistungen im Entwurf zum Boersengesetz und im EG-Recht - eine Uebersicht, 1994
Pratique Juridique Actuelle (PJA) 294.
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sufficient organization to warrant compliance with the law, minimum
capital (or, for individuals, payment of security), and adequate qualifi-
cation and reputation warranting blameless business conduct. The re-
quirement of good standing and reputation also applies to the
controlling shareholders of broker-dealer companies. Where a broker-
dealer is part of a financial group, the FBC may also condition its
granting of a license on adequate consolidated supervision over and
acquisition of a business license by the group in its home jurisdic-
tion.57 Again, details will be set out in the Ordinance, which will also
provide rules on the licensing of foreign broker-dealers who have
neither a seat on an exchange nor an establishment in Switzerland.
Licenses will be granted on a reciprocal basis.
Like exchanges, broker-dealers must thus provide for sufficient
self-regulation and control both with respect to their internal organiza-
tion and the handling of client matters. The SEA expressly lists some
basic rules of conduct that give rise to civil liability if violated. These
rules of conduct are client-related and reflect the mostly self-evident
principles of agency law, such as the obligation to exercise orders with
due care and diligence, the duty of loyalty and good faith (including
disclosure of conflicts of interest), and the duty properly to inform cli-
ents, particularly as to the risks involved in a transaction. 58 Parliament
has eliminated the provisions which would have required broker-deal-
ers to issue general conditions of contract and to submit them for ap-
proval to the FBC.
Apart from minimum capital requirements, the SEA obliges bro-
ker-dealers to have sufficient funds of their own and to maintain sound
risk-spreading on a consolidated basis. Again, detailed requirements
will be set out in the Ordinance. 59 Given the fact that Swiss capital
adequacy requirements for banks are the highest in the world, compet-
itive regulation would warrant orientation on the EC Capital Adequacy
Directive (which provides for risk-based minimum levels for various
market risks) rather than on the FBA.60 However, the recent cases of
57 See SEA, supra note 1, at art. 10.
58 See id. at art. 11.
59 See id. at arts. 12-14.
60 See Council Directive 93/6 of March 15, 1993 on the Capital Adequacy of Investment
Firms and Credit Institutions, 1993 O.J. (L 141) 1 [hereinafter CAD]. Capital will be needed
under the CAD with respect to position risks, settlement and counterparty risks, foreign ex-
change risks, and large exposures. See generally Ashall, supra note 40, at 92. The regulators
will also monitor interest rate risks. Id. Because of the initial intention to standardize the
capital regulatory regime for investments firms, a great conflict existed prior to the EC mem-
ber states' agreement upon the ISD and the CAD. Id. This would have resulted in a capital
regulatory regime for investment firms similar to the one established by the banking direc-
tives (the Own Funds Directive, the Solvency Ratio Directive, and the Large Exposures Direc-
tive), which impose quite stringent capital requirements. Id. Traditionally, investment firms
have a rather small capital base as a result of the type of activities in which they participate.
Id. However, in many countries, investment firms and banks compete with each other. Id.
Therefore, equal standards had to be established where both types of institutions would com-
pete on the same markets, particularly with regard to market risks. Id As stated above, the
[VOL. 20
REGULATION OF SWISS CAPITAL MARKETS
turmoil on the derivatives market (failure of Barings Bank) may have
bolstered the case for more stringent capital and own-funds require-
ments for market risks.61 Finally, broker-dealers are obliged to estab-
lish records of all orders received and transactions effected.
Additional filing and disclosure requirements will be issued by the
FBC. 62 Detailed accounting rules will be enacted by the Government
from which rules banks subject to regulation under the FBA will be
exempted. Broker-dealers must publish their annual accounts or make
them otherwise available to the public. They must be audited by in-
dependent, specially qualified and authorized auditors (such as those
approved under the FBA). Such auditors will assume an extensive po-
licing role and directly report to the FBC.6 3
III. Disclosure of Major Holdings and Takeover Regulations
A. Disclosure of Major Holdings
Since 1992, corporate law has required the disclosure of major
holdings in shareholding companies that have shares listed on or off
an exchange. Under the Code of Obligations, a company must pub-
lish in the annex to its annual accounts the names and the holdings of
shareholders (or groups of shareholders) bound by voting right agree-
ments which either exceed five percent of the total voting right capital
or any lower percentage of registered shares as determined in its arti-
cles of incorporation, if the company knows or is bound to know those
shareholders. 64 However, the shareholders do not appear to have a
duty to inform the company about their holding, and the provision is
not accompanied by any sanction. 65 To provide greater transparency,
the Code's accounting provisions have also been amended, and groups
CAD now imposes capital requirements for certain market risks relating to activities that
come within the definition found in the "Trading Book." Id, This definition has been kept
broad so that the capital requirments apply both to investment firms and banks for risks
arising out of the activities so defined in the "Trading Book." Id. This excludes application of
the more onerous capital requirements to investment firms in this area. See generally id,;
Bond et al., Capital Markets, in FINANCIAL SERVICES IN EUROPE 33-34 (D. Cambell & M. Moore
eds., 1993).
61 Cf Hearings held by the Swiss House of Representatives on the subject on March 14,
1995, 7th Sess. See Bulletin officiel/Conseil National, No. 93.025, Mar. 14, 1995 (draft rec-
ord) (discussing the new guidelines on risk management of derivatives issued by the Basle
Committee and the International Organization for Off-Securities Commissioners currently
examined by Swiss National Bank and FBC).
62 See SEA, supra note 1, at art. 15.
63 See id. at arts. 18, 19.
64 See CO art. 663c(1).
65 See CO art. 663c. In contrast to Article 20 of the SEA, Article 663c of the CO insti-
tutes an obligation on the company, not an obligation on the shareholder. On the one
hand, this obligation is more comprehensive than the obligation of Article 20 of the SEA, as
it does not provide for group exemptions; but, on the other hand, it is less inclusive than
Article 20 of the SEA, because it does not extend to persons who act in concert. For a discus-
sion of article 663c CO, see generally, Peter Forstmoser, OR 663c-ein wenig transparantes
Transparenzgebot, in ASPEKTE DES WIRTSCHAMRErsCHTS 69 (H.U. Walder et al. eds., 1994).
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of companies must report their financial statements on a consolidated
basis.66 The amendments to the Code also reduced the admissibility of
restrictions on the transfer of registered shares which are listed.
Under prior law, a company's board of directors could refuse registra-
tion of acquirors of registered shares as shareholders in its sharehold-
ers' register without giving any reasons. 67 Under the revised
provisions, listed companies may no longer refuse registration of a
shareholder for any reason. Rather, only two types of restrictions are
permitted that the company must, in addition, expressly include in its
articles of incorporation: (i) the possibility to impose limits on the per-
centage of registered shares which an individual (or group of share-
holders acting in concert) may hold and (ii) the refusal of registration
as a shareholder where an applicant does not expressly declare to hold
the shares in his own name and for his own account. 68
The SEA will introduce more comprehensive disclosure require-
ments, which, in contrast to the EC Transparency Directive, concern
only shareholding companies. 69 Any individual who, acting directly, in-
directly, or in concert with others, acquires or disposes of, for his own
account, shares of a company incorporated in Switzerland that has
shares (voting and non-voting) at least partially listed on a Swiss Ex-
change, must disclose his holding to the company and the exchange, if
it reaches, exceeds, or falls below the thresholds of 5, 10, 20, 331/3, 50,
or 662/3% of the total voting rights of the company. In this respect, the
Swiss legislature has largely borrowed from the EC Transparency Direc-
tive and less from the U.S. and English models. 70 The requirement of
66 See generally CO arts. 662a, 663 - 663b. See also CO arts. 663e-663h (regarding groups
of companies and their obligation to produce consolidated accounts).
67 See former CO art. 686(2) (1937); Walter R. Schluep, Vinkulierung, in SCHWEIZ. AKT-
IENGESELLSCHAFr 122, 125 (1976).
68 See CO art. 685d(1)-(2). These limitations do not apply where the acquisition is
made through succession or dissolution of a marital property regime. See CO art. 685d(2).
In addition, the final provisions of the Code of Obligations (Article 4) provide that registra-
tion may be refused on the ground that after such registration, the Company might no
longer be able to provide evidence of Swiss domination (which is still required by some laws,
such as the Lex Friedrich that limits the purchase by foreigners of real estate in Switzerland).
See Bundesgesetz ueber den Erwerb von Grundstuecken durch Personen im Ausland [Lex
Friedrich of December 16, 19831, RS 211.412.41, at art. 6(2). For purposes of calculating the
percentage limitations, the company may either include all types of shares or rely exclusively
on the total number of outstanding registered shares. See generally Shelby du Pasquier & Mat-
thias Oertie, Kommentar zum Schweizerischen Privatrecht, Obligationenrecht II 676-683 (H.
Honsell et al. eds., 1993).
69 See SEA, supra note 1, at art. 20; Council Directive 88/627 of December 12, 1988 on
the Information to be Published when a Major Holding in a Listed Company is Acquired or
Disposed of, 1988 O.J. (L 348) 62 [hereinafter Transparency Directive].
70 The Transparency Directive provides for thresholds of 10%, 20%, 50% and 662/s%.
The member states may also introduce thresholds of 25% instead of 20% or 331/s%, or 75%
instead of 662/s%. See Transparency Directive, supra note 69, at art. 4(1). Under the U.S.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Williams Act), direct or indirect holdings of 5% and more
of the share capital in each class of shares must be disclosed within a ten-day window. See 15
U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1988) (requiring that persons acquiring more that 5% of certain classes of
securities file a report with the SEC). See also 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1994) (setting out the
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disclosure under the SEA also applies to groups of shareholders who
are contractually or otherwise bound. However, such shareholders
must comply with the requirement as a group only by disclosing the
total holding, the identity of the individual members of the group (but
not their individual holdings), the type of agreement by which they are
bound, and the identity of their representatives. 71 Thus, modifications
within the group need not be reportedas long as the group's holding
as such is kept stable. The group notification is particularly designed
for small or family holdings, but it will also relieve groups of companies
from separately notifying the holdings of each of their subsidiaries. It
should be noted, however, that Art. 663c of the Code of Obligations
does not provide for such a group exemption. Since the Code does
not include any direct sanction, however, some listed companies may
be expected not to disclose the composition of the group in the annex
to their annual financial statements despite the wording of Art. 663c,
since such disclosure will not be required under the SEA's provi-
sions. 72 The EC Transparency Directive also does not provide for such
a general group exemption; but, it does exempt persons or entities
who are members of a group of undertakings (which are required
under the Consolidated Accounts Directive 73 to draw up consolidated
accounts) from making the declaration of disclosure, if a disclosure is
made by its parent or by its own parent undertaking (where its parent
is itself a subsidiary.) 74
For purposes of computation under the SEA's provisions, the con-
version of non-voting shares or profit-sharing certificates into voting
shares and the exercise of convertibles or analogous rights are
equivalent to an acquisition. 75 Any potential acquiror may request the
FBC for a ruling on the existence or non-existence of an eventual dis-
closure obligation).76
The company must publish all information received on the com-
position and modification of such holdings.7 7 If either the company
form that must be filed with the SEC). Individuals or entities acting in concert are consid-
ered as one person for this purpose. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(3) (1988). Furthermore, any
additional purchase of 2% made within a period of 12 months must be disclosed. See 15
U.S.C. § 78m(d)(6)(B) (1988). In the United Kingdom, a disclosure obligation exists with
respect to an interest of 3% or more in the shares of a shareholding company irrespective of
whether its shares are listed. Such interest must be disclosed within two days after reaching
the threshold. See Companies Act, 1985, secs. 198-202 (Eng.); Companies Act, 1989, sec. 134
(Eng.). For a discussion of the complicated and detailed English regulation, see GRAHAM
STEDMAN, TAKEOVERS 152-62 (1993).
71 See SEA, supra note 1, at arts. 20(3)(a)-(d).
72 One would expect the legislature to repeal this provision once the SEA becomes
effective. However, no action has been undertaken yet or is planned in this sense.
73 See Directive on Consolidated Accounts 83/349 of May 16, 1983 (Consolidated Ac-
counts Directive or 7th Company Directive), 1983 O.J. (L 193/1) 1.
74 See Transparency Directive, supra note 69, at art. 6.
75 See SEA, supra note 1, at art. 20(2).
76 See id. at art. 20(6).
77 See id. at art. 21.
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or exchange has reason to believe that these obligations have been
violated, it must notify the FBC. 78 Offenders are criminally liable and
may be fined up to a maximum amount of twice the purchase or sales
price. The fine is calculated on the basis of the difference between the
holding after acquisition or sale and the last notified threshold
amount.79 The Act does not, however, provide specific civil remedies
for aggrieved investors.
It is difficult to appraise these provisions presently as the FBC
(upon recommendation of the Takeover Commission (TOC)) will
have to set out detailed requirements regarding the scope of disclo-
sure, the definitions of acquisition, disposal, convertibles and similar
rights, the computation of voting rights,80 and the periods within
which notice must be filed by the shareholders and the company re-
spectively.8 ' The difference between the SEA and the EC Trans-
parency Directive in this regard could not be more striking: While the
Directive contains a clear definition of "acquisition" and extensively
lists the scenarios of control to which it extends, 82 the SEA is unclear as
to which kind of shareholder agreements constitute a controlling
group. Given the purpose of the disclosure requirement, it may be
expected that the terms acquisition/disposal comprise any form of
transfer (including gratuitous transfers) of voting rights. 83 Further-
more, it remains to be seen whether the obligation is already triggered
when shareholders enter into a shareholding agreement without ac-
quiring shares in addition to those which they already hold or control.
In the author's view, the purpose of the disclosure requirement would
mandate that the obligation be triggered upon signing of the agree-
78 See id. at art. 20(4).
79 See id. at art. 39.
80 Several important questions remain unanswered. For example, if a company has ac-
quired a part of its own outstanding shares, it has not been decided whether these shares
must be taken into account. A company may acquire up to 10% of its own shares, and, in
conjunction with the purchase of registered shares with restricted transfer, up to 20% of its
own shares, the voting rights of which will then be suspended. See CO art. 659a. It is also
unclear how to treat shares held by subsidiaries. A subsidiary is a company of which the
parent controls 50% or more of its voting rights. The voting rights of shares of the parent
company held by such a subsidiary are suspended. See CO art. 659b.
81 Under the Transparency Directive, a shareholder must give notice of his holding to
the company and the competent authorities of the state of its incorporation within seven
calendar days, and the company must publish it within nine calendar days after such notifica-
tion. See Transparency Directive, supra note 69, at arts. 4(1), 10(1). If such short deadlines
are chosen, the TOC should define the kind of knowledge that a shareholder had or should
have had about his holding, since a shareholder might not always be informed as quickly as
required about the holdings of the companies which he controls.
82 See Transparency Directive, supra note 69, at arts. 2, 7. See also generally EUK
WERLAUFF, EC COMPANY LAW 285-88 (1993).
83 Cf Transparency Directive, supra note 69, at art. 2. For example, the granting of a
life interest on shares would be considered an acquisition, as it is the beneficiary that may
exercise the voting rights. See CO art. 690(2); cf. Transparency Directive, supra note 69, at art.
7(1)(6). In contrast, the pledging of shares cannot be considered a form of disposal, since
the voting rights remain with the pledgor. See CODE CIVIL [C. ctv.] art. 905 (Swiss Civil Code)
[hereinafter Cc].
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ment, but the same should not apply for the obligation to make a
bid.84 Finally, one would expect that such shareholders will only be
considered as acting in concert if their agreement concerns the exer-
cise of their voting rights; shareholders who simply vote together on
certain issues should not normally be held to have acted in concert. 85
It would also have been worthwhile for a more effective prevention of
market manipulations by insiders to oblige officers and directors of
listed companies to disclose periodically their holdings and trading,
irrespective of the applicable thresholds, as it is the case under U.S.




In 1989, the Association of Swiss Exchanges (ASE) adopted the
Swiss Take-Over Code (STOC) to insure fair play by the market partici-
pants and to enable shareholders and the target company to make an
informed decision upon a public offer.88 The STOC instituted for
these purposes a Commission for Regulation as a self-regulatory body
of the industry. The STOC was supplemented in May 1993 by the Swiss
Code Governing Public Offers for Debt Securities that was issued by
the ASE and the Swiss Banker's Association. 89 The drafters of the
STOC borrowed substantially from the City Code on Takeovers and
Mergers.90 The City Code, without having the force of law, has been
widely respected and is at least indirectly accompanied by sanctions.91
The STOC applies only to exchanges and banks, but not to third
party offerors. It does not regulate private offers and is not accompa-
nied by sanctions. While several cases where minority shareholders
84 See infra part III.B.3.
85 SeeThe City Code on Takeover and Mergers, note 2 on Rule 9.1 (1990), published in
WEINBERG AND BLANK ON TAKE-OVERS AND MERGERS, part 7a (L. Rabinowitz et al. eds., 5th ed.
1991) [hereinafter City Code].
86 See 15 U.S.C. § 7 8q (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (setting out the periodic filing obligations
under Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
87 For a comparative discussion of such requirements, see M. SENN, AusKuNrrs-
BEGEHREN AUSLAENDISCHER GESELLSCHAFrEN UEBER DIE AKTIONAERSEIGENSCHAFT UND SCHWEI-
ZERISCHE GEHEIMHALTUNGSPFLICHTEN 232 (1992).
88 The Swiss Take-Over Code (STOC) is published in the handbook of the Zurich Stock
Exchange. See Aktien-Kodex, in HANDBUCH DER ZUERCHER BOERSE (1994) [hereinafter STOC].
A translation into English can be found in ALtRED DUFOUR & GERaD HERTIG, LES Pusrs DE
PARTICIPATIONS: L'EXEMPLE DES OFFRES PUBLIQouES D'ACHAT 760 (1990) (however, this version
does not include some modifications made in 1992 and 1994).
89 See Obligationen-Kodex, in HANDBUCH DER ZUERCHER BOERSE (1994).
90 See also Alain Hirsch & D. Siegrist, Comments on the Swiss Take-over Code, cmt. a.3
(1990).
91 The failure of compliance with the Code may lead to withdrawal of authorization by
SROs and by the Securities Investment Board. For a discussion of the various SROs, see
INTERNATIONAL FINANCING LIBRAv, SECURITIES REGULATION IN THE U.K. 33-39 (Freshfields
ed., 1987).
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had been treated in a grossly unfair manner had occurred since its
inception, the investment community appears largely to have complied
with the STOC in the last couple of years. 92 Nevertheless, it will be
superseded by the SEA's provisions on disclosure of major holdings
and takeover bids, meaning that the self-regulatory mechanisms will be
replaced by federal law. While the Government's draft proposal would
have afforded most of the regulatory powers to public authorities, Par-
liament has again shifted the focus and considerably strengthened the
self-regulatory mechanisms by delegating supervisory powers to self-
regulatory organizations (SROs), as discussed below. In its spring 1995
session, the Speaker of the Commission of the House of Representa-
tives specifically referred to the regulations of the City Code as the
rules governing takeovers on the Londoner City as one of the major
competitors of the Swiss exchanges; Switzerland, he said, should have
regulations analogous to those of the City as regards fairness on the
markets. 93 The House of Representatives therefore followed the ad-
vice of its Commission and adopted the provisions on takeovers despite
last-minute efforts to strike them off.
9 4
2. Public Takeover Bids
First, as to public takeover bids, the Houses of Parliament resolved
to introduce a Takeover Commission (TOC). The TOC is to consist of
representatives of broker-dealers of listed companies and representa-
tives of investors to be nominated by the FBC.95 Second, the TOC will
be entitled to propose detailed regulations to be approved by the FBC
regarding the disclosure and the takeover provisions of the SEA. 96
The TOC will furthermore act as a first-level supervisory body and, as
such, will have the necessary investigative powers.97 It will act infor-
92 For a recent survey in English of cases reviewed by the Commission for Regulation,
see Swiss REvIEw OF BusiNEss LAw 130 (1994). Recently, there has been some English cri-
tique regarding the acquisition of the Fust company byJelmoli, since the owner of Fust was
given a substantial premium. See Thomas Lustenberger, in NEUE ZUERCHER ZErUNG, No.
222, Sept. 23, 1994, at 29. The SEA will allow for a premium of 25%. See infra part III.B.3.
93 See Bulletin Officiel/Conseil National, No. 93.025, Mar. 14, 1995, at 1-2 (draft
version).
94 In its January 1995 session, the House of Representatives sent the draft proposal back
to the Commission for review of Article 30 and the takeover regulations contained therein on
the grounds that the proposed EC Takeover Directive would not be adopted in the near
future because of disagreement between the UK and Germany on the issue. The House of
Representatives has now agreed on the Senate's version, and the Senate has in turn accepted
the wording as proposed by the House of Representatives in its spring 1995 session (hearings
of March 21, 1995). See Bulletin Officiel/Conseil National, No. 93.025, Mar. 14, 1995, at 5
(draft version discussing the hearings of the House of Representatives); Neue Zuercher
Zeitung, No. 68, Mar. 22, 1995, at 17 (discussing the Senate's hearings).
95 See SEA, supra note 1, at art. 22bis.
96 See id. at art. 22bis(2) (setting forth the regulations issued by TOC subject to approval
by FBC); id. at art. 20(5) (providing for the issue of regulations regarding disclosure by FBC
upon request by TOC); id. at art. 30(5) (providing for the issue of detailed regulations by
FBC on takeovers upon request by TOC).
97 See id. at art. 22bis(3).
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mally and seek voluntary compliance with the law and its regulations
through recommendations. If a party fails to comply voluntarily, the
TOC may refer the case to the FBC which may issue a formal decision.
This decision will be subject to appeal before an independent Take-
over Review Commission. 98
The takeover provisions of Section Five of the SEA generally apply
to all public tender offers (takeover bids) for securities of companies
incorporated in Switzerland (target companies) that have their securi-
ties at least partially listed on a Swiss Exchange. This section applies to
all forms of companies, including cooperatives.99 The term "securi-
ties" comprises, in this context, unlike the amended proposal for an
EC Takeover Directive, 00 voting and non-voting shares, profit-sharing
certificates, convertibles, options, warrants, and other transferable in-
struments conferring the right to purchase voting or non-voting shares
traded on or off exchange. 01 These provisions apply both to friendly
and unfriendly bids, but do not apply to "creeping tender offers,"102
except where an obligation to make a bid exists. While the Act speaks
of offers to purchase, the term must be deemed to include offers pro-
viding for payment in other securities (i.e., an exchange for other
shares) as under the Draft Takeover Directive.103
The offeror must publish a prospectus that is required to contain
98 See id. at arts. 22bis(3)-(4), 37(3).
99 For example, several of the listed insurance companies are incorporated as co-opera-
tives, such as the Rentenanstalt (Swiss Life Insurance Co.), Zurich. See ARTHUR MEIER-HEYoz
& PETER FoRSTMOSER, GRUNDRISS DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN GESEULSCHAFTRECHTS 383 (7th ed.
1993).
100 SeeAmended Proposal for a Thirteenth Council Directive on Company Law Concern-
ing Takeovers and Other General Bids, 1990 O.J. (C240/7) of September 26, 1990, 7 [here-
inafter Draft Takeover Directive]. The proposal has met resistance from many sides and no
decision could be reached on it in the Council of Ministers. See Peter Wiesner, Stand des
europaeischen Unternehmensrechts, EUR.J. Bus. L. 588, 589 (1994). The Commission is currently
reconsidering it in view of the principle of subordination to national law, since the actual
version would not likely ever pass the Council of Ministers. Id. For an English critique of the
proposal, see Stephen Kenyon-Slade & Mads Andenas, The Proposed Thirteenth Directive on Take-
Overs: Unravelling the United Kingdom's Self Regulatory Success?, in E.C. FINANCIAL. MARKET REGU-
LATION AND COMPANY LAW 149 (Mads Andenas & Stephen Kenyon-Slade eds., 1993); Len
Sealy, The Draft Thirteenth E.C. Directive on Take-Overs, in E.C. FINANCIAL MARKET REGULATION
AND COMPANY LAW 135 (Mads Andenas & Stephen Kenyon-Slade eds., 1993). See also Jan
Wouters, Towards a Level Playing Field for Takeovers in the European Community? An Analysis of
the Proposed Thirteenth Directive in Light of American Experiences, 30 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 267
(1993) (comparing EC proposal with U.S. legislation and practice).
101 See SEA, supra note 1, at arts. 2(d), 22 (defining security for purposes of the takeover
provisions of Section 5); id. at art. 30(1). The House of Representatitves has accepted this
term of "titres cot~s en bourse" in its spring 1995 session. See Bulletin Officiel/Conseil Na-
tional, No. 93.025, Mar. 14, 1995, at 5 (draft version).
102 In the case of a creeping tender offer, the acquiror purchases the shares both directly
and indirectly through affiliated entities or strawmen on the stock exchange over an ex-
tended period of time. See RUDOLF TSCHAENI, UNTRNEHMENSUESERNAHMEN NACH SCHWEIZER
RECHT 227-28 (2d. ed. 1991).
103 This follows from the definition of public tender offer found in Article 2(d) of the
SEA, which also comprises the exchange of securities. SEA, supra note 1, at art. 2(d). See also
Draft Takeover Directive, supra note 100, at art. 2.
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the information necessary to enable the addressees of the bid to make
an informed decision on the offer. Detailed requirements with respect
to the contents of the prospectus, notice of the bid prior to its publica-
tion, conditions of the offer, its revocation and modification, the offer
period, and rules guaranteeing equal treatment of addressees during
the offer period will have to be set out in detail by the TOC. 10 4 Of
course, much will depend on the information that such a prospectus
will be required to contain. The TOC may be expected to draw from
the experience acquired under the STOC and its detailed regulations
for the drafting of its own rules. A brief look at those rules is thus
worthwhile, despite the fact that they will be superseded by the SEA.
The STOC requires that the offer memorandum include information
on the offeror and those acting in concert with him, the disclosure of
agreements with the target's directors, the details of and the minimum
and maximum number of securities to be acquired, the price or other
consideration offered per share, the details of the offeror's present
holding, and the duration of the offer period.10 5 However, unlike the
City Code or the Draft Takeover Directive, the STOC does not require
the offeror to provide information on its intention regarding the con-
tinuation of the target's operations and business, its employees, and
the long-term commercial justification for the proposed offer.10 6 Such
vital information should, in the author's view, be presented to permit
the present owners to make a truly informed decision.
The SEA obliges the offeror to treat all holders of the same type of
securities equally. Thus, if the offeror purchases shares above the offer
price during the offer period, the offer must be increased accordingly
(best price rule).17 In the case of a partial offer, it would follow that
acceptances must be treated pro rata if not all of them can be satis-
fied.' 08 The offer as such may only be subject to conditions that the
offeror himself cannot influence, such as the acquisition of govern-
mental authorizations or the approval of an increase in capital by the
shareholders. 10 9 The offeror must submit the offer prior to publica-
tion to approved auditors or a broker-dealer for review, whereas the
Draft Takeover Directive would require submission to the supervisory
authority which could forbid publication or require correction of an
104 See SEA, supra note 1, at art. 22bis(2) (as introduced by 'the House of
Representatives).
105 See STOC, supra note 88, at arts. 4.1-4.6. See also Hirsch & Siegrist, supra note 90, cmt.
at Rules 4-4.6.
106 Compare STOC, supra note 88, at arts. 4.1-4.6 with City Code, supra note 85, Rules 24.1
& 24.2; Draft Takeover Directive, supra note 100, at arts. 10, 10(1).
107 See Explanatory Report, supra note 1, at 1312. See also Hirsch & Siegrist, supra note
90, cmt. at Rule 3.1; Draft Takeover Directive, supra note 100, at art. 16.
108 Cf STOC, supra note 88, Rule 3.8.
109 The City Code does not allow such conditioning where the offer is for more than
50% of the voting rights. See City Code, supra note 85, Rule 10 (voluntary offers), Rule 9.3
(mandatory offers), and Rule 13 (relating to EC Council Directive 4064/89 regarding
merger control).
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inadequate offer.1 10 The offeror must also publish the result of the
tender after expiration of the offer period. If the conditions of the
offer have been met, the offeror must extend the offer period for those
offerees who have not accepted the offer at that time. The obligations
imposed on the offeror also apply to those with whom the offeror is
acting in concert."' l
The board of directors of the target company must submit a re-
port to the holders of its securities and set out its opinion regarding
the offer. It must then publish this report.11 2 Again, detailed report-
ing requirements will have to be issued by the TOC. After publication
of the offer and until its result is made public, the board of the target
may not engage in transactions which would have the effect of altering
significantly the assets or liabilities of the company. 13 For example,
prohibited transactions would logically include the issuance of new se-
curities, the purchase by the company of its own shares, the issuance of
authorized capital and its placement with a white knight, and the sale
of crown jewels.' 14 In contrast, decisions of the shareholders' meeting
are not subject to such limitations.' 15 The crux for offerors is that
listed Swiss companies may continue to limit, in their articles of incor-
poration, a shareholder's direct or indirect holding.1 16 A company
may also include specific quotas for the modification of its articles of
incorporation. An offeror cannot require the holding of a sharehold-
ers meeting after having made his offer, unless he already controls a
minimum of ten percent of the total voting rights pursuant to ordinary
company law. 117
This may prove to be too time consuming in the midst of a take-
over battle, quite apart from the difficulty of garnering any qualified
majority, which may be required for striking such clauses from the arti-
cles of incorporation. The SEA does not provide for the lifting of such
restrictions in case of a public offer. It may, therefore, be virtually im-
possible to launch a hostile bid successfully, where the target company
has included such restrictions in its articles of incorporation.
110 Compare SEA, supra note 1, at art. 23 with Draft Takeover Directive, supra note 100, at
arts. 6(2), 7(3).
111 See generally SEA, supra note 1, at arts. 23-26.
112 SeeSEA, supra note 1, atart. 27(1); cf Draft Takeover Directive, supra note 100, atart.
14.
113 SeeSEA, supranote 1, at art. 27(2); cf Draft Takeover Directive, supra note 100, at art.
8.
114 In contrast, Rule 6.1 of the STOC allows the target's board and management to take
any defensive measures they wish to undertake. STOC, supra note 88, Rule 6.1.
115 Cf Draft Takeover Directive, supra note 100, at art. 8.
116 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
1 17 Rule 6.2 of the STOC provides that an offeror who has acquired more than 10% of
the share capital (not voting rights), including acceptances received from current sharehold-
ers, may request the convening of a shareholders meeting which the board of directors of the
target company must call as soon as possible. This applies even where the board rejected the
registration of the bidder's registered shares in the company's share register. STOC, supra
note 88, Rule 6.2.
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Finally, the bidder or any other person who controls, directly, in-
directly, or in concert with others, five percent or more of the voting
rights of the target or of another company that has its securities of-
fered in exchange, must throughout the offer period notify the TOC
and the exchange of any purchase or sale of the securities of such com-
pany. "8 The TOC may subject other holders of securities of the target
company to the same disclosure requirement.' 19 However, unlike
under the EC Draft Takeover Directive, 120 the requirement does not
apply to other holders of securities of the bidding company.
3. Obligation to Make a Bid
Whoever acquires, directly, indirectly, or in concert with others, 21
securities of the target company which when added to any existing
holding give him voting rights which exceed 33'/s% of the total voting
rights of the target,' 22 must make a bid to acquire all the securities of
the target that are then listed on the exchange.1 23 The target may,
however, increase the threshold to 49% of its total voting rights in its
articles of incorporation. 124 Upon the effective date of the Act, an ob-
ligation to make a bid also applies to persons who control more than
33'/3%, but less than 50% of a company's total voting rights, if their
holdings exceed the 50% threshold upon acquisition of additional
shares.1 25
The bidding price must be equivalent to the price quoted at the
exchange and may not be lower by more than 25% of the highest price
which the bidder paid for securities of the target within the last twelve
months. 126 A bidder who controls 98% of the voting rights after expi-
118 See SEA, supra note 1, at arts. 29(1), 29(2).
119 See id. at art. 29(3); in this context, cf. City Code, supra note 85, Rule 4.2 (prohibiting
offeror and concerted parties to sell securities in target during offer period), Rule 4.1
(prohibiting insiders to deal in securities during offer period), and Rule 8.1 (requiring pub-
lic disclosure of dealing by offeror in target's securities during offer period).
120 See Draft Takeover Directive, supra note 100, at art. 17.
121 In this context, cf City Code, supra note 85, notes on Rule 9.1. See alsoT. Peter Lee,
Takeover Regulation in the United Kingdom, in Lrs PRISES DE PARTICIPATIONS: L' PXEMPLE DES
OFRES PLUBLIQUES D'ACHAT 280, 287 (Alfred Dufour & Gerard Hertig eds., 1990); STEDMAN,
supra note 70, at 191-92.
122 Parliament has made it clear that for purposes of computation of the threshold,
more specifically, the calculation of the denominator, all controlled voting rights must be
taken into account, irrespective of whether these rights can be exercised or not. See Bulletin
officiel/Conseil National, No. 93.025, 7th Sess., Mar. 14, 1995, at 2. Thus, where the target
company holds its own shares, those shares will be taken into account despite the fact that
the voting rights connected therewith will be suspended. Id.
123 SeeSEA, supra note 1, at art. 30(1) (more than 33 1/3%); cf. Draft Takeover Directive,
supra note 100, at art. 4(a) (33 1/3%). Under the City Code, the offer is mandatory at a level
of 30% already. See City Code, supra note 85, Rule 9.1. The STOC had set this limit to 50%
only. See STOC, supra note 88, Rule 3,.8.
124 See SEA, supra note 1, at art. 30(1) (introduced by the House of Representatives and
accepted by the Senate).
125 See id. at art. 51.
126 See id. at art. 30(3). In contrast, the Draft Takeover Directive, supra note 100, con-
[VOL. 20
1995] REGULATION OF SWISS CAPITAL MARKETS
ration of the offer period may, within a three-month period, petition
the competent court to cancel the remaining 2%. The company then
reissues these securities to the bidder against payment of the offer
price which it will hold for the account of the former owners.127
The obligation to make a bid exists in principle irrespective of the
manner in which the obligor acquired the securities. Nevertheless, ex-
emptions apply if the voting rights were acquired through donation,
succession, distribution of assets of an estate, marital property, or
forceful execution.' 28 The Catologue of exemptions has been ex-
tended by the House of Representatives and approved by the Senate.
Thus, exemptions may apply if transfers within a group of shareholders
occur and the obligation to make a bid is triggered because the
number of outstanding shares is reduced.1 29 In particular, Parliament
also took over some of the exemptions provided in the City Code, such
as the exemption where the obligation is triggered due to a gratuitous
issue of shares or the use of preferred rights of subscription upon an
increase of the share capital and the exemption in case of rescue of a
failing company and where the threshold is reached or exceeded only
temporarily.'30 The FBC may grant additional exemptions or revoke
an exemption where it would result in an unfair treatment of all
shareholders. 131 The voting rights of a shareholder who violates the
tains no provisions on the price, whereas the City Code requires that it be not less than the
highest price paid by the offeror or any person acting in concert with it for shares of the
respective class within the preceding 12 months. See City Code, supra note 85, Rule 9.5(a).
127 See SEA, supra note 1, at art. 31. The Explanatory Report, supra note 1, does not
indicate a reason for the choice of the 98% threshold for a forced buy-out. The experts had
suggested a 95% threshold. It should be noted that the German Law on Group of Companies
provides for such forced buy-out of minority shareholders once the parent company controls
95% of the share capital. See Aktiengesetz art. 320, Bundesgesetzblatt, BGBI 11089 (1965)
(Official record of German Laws).
128 See also Draft Takeover Directive, supra note 100, at arts. 4, 5 (providing for similar
exemptions).
129 See Bulletin Officiel/Conseil National, No. 93.025, Mar. 14, 1995, at 2 (draft version).
130 See id.; SEA, supra note 1, at art. 30(2). Cf. also City Code, supra note 85, note 11 on
Rule 9.1 (setting forth the "Whitewash" proceeding); id. note 1 on Notes on Dispensations
from Rule 9. Usually, the Panel will consider the dilution of a percentage held due to an
increase in the share capital as triggering the obligation if the group or shareholder attempts
to restore the previous level of control through purchases of shares. However, the obligation
will be waived by the Panel, if there has been an independent vote at a shareholders' meet-
ing. This also applies where a new issue of securities occurs as consideration for an acquisi-
tion. The City Code also provides exemptions in case of rescue operations and where the
threshold is exceeded inadvertently only. See City Code, supra note 85, notes 3 & 4 on Notes
on Dispensations from Rule 9. The EC Draft Takeover Directive also contains similar exemp-
tions as those now introduced by the House of Representatives. Cf Draft Takeover Directive,
supra note 100, at art. 4(2c) (d) (exceeding threshold by not more than 3% does not trigger
obligation if written undertaking to sell sufficient securities within one year); id. art. 4(2c) (g)
(stating that the acquisition of additional shares through use of preferred subscription rights
upon increase of sharecapital does not trigger threshold).
131 See SEA, supra note 1, at art. 30(2)-(3). The SEA particularly refers to the case of the
sale within groups of shareholders. The FBC may authorize those shareholders to comply
with the obligation as a group only. That the FBC shall have the power to revoke an exemp-
tion in a particular case was expressed by the Speaker of the Commission of the House of
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provision on compulsory bidding may be suspended temporarily by
court decision upon request by the FBC, the target, or one of the
target's shareholders.13 2
4. Opting Out from the Obligation to Make a Bid
Parliament has added a provision to Section Five of the Act which
allows any company to introduce in its articles of incorporation, prior
to listing, a provision exempting acquirors of its shares from the obliga-
tion to make a bid. Companies that have their securities already listed
when the Act becomes effective may include such an opting-out clause
in their articles within a one-year transition period.1 33 The exemption
is particularly designed for companies with large family holdings. 134 In
addition, the shareholders' meeting may resolve to introduce such an
opting-out clause in the company's articles even after listing has been
obtained, except that the rights of the existing shareholders must not
be affected. 135 An exchange must separately list companies with opt-
ing-out clauses to enable investors to make an informed decision on
their investment. Investors are still at some risk, however, as compa-
nies can introduce such clauses later without the Act requiring a partic-
ular quorum.
IV. Listing of Securities
The SSE's admission board (SAB) is currently drafting new admis-
sion rules to comply with the provisions of the SEA.13 6 The SAB also
endeavored to draft rules compatible with EC law i3 7 in order to facili-
Representatives and accepted by the House, see Bulletin Officiel/Conseil National, No.
93.025, Mar. 14, 1995, at 2, 5 (draft version).
132 Article 30(6) of the SEA, which would have given a court the power to allocate the
suspended voting rights proportionally to other shareholders was eliminated by Parliament.
See Bulletin Officiel/Conseil National, No. 93.025, Mar. 14, 1995, at 2, 5 (draft version).
133 See SEA, supra note 1, at arts. 22(2), 51bis.
134 Cf HANS KAUFMANN & BEAT KUNZ, SWISS SHARE OWNERSHIP (BankJ. Baer & Co. ed.,
1991). The study by these authors covers 114 companies listed on or off exchange. Eleven
companies did not disclose any information about major holdings. In more than seventy
companies, there existed major holdings in the voting power controlled by families and
other groups of shareholders. Only 19 companies, which nevertheless represented about
50% of the market capitalization, could be deemed as truly publicly held without being con-
trolled by certain groups of shareholders.
135 See SEA, supra note 1, at art. 22(2)-(3). In practice, the reference to the rights of
existing shareholders means that such decision is subject to appeal within two months after
the shareholders' meeting. See CO art. 706.
136 See Swiss Admission Board, Rhvision du Rhglement de Cotation (Consultative Paper,
January 1995) [hereinafter SAB Draft Rules].
137 See Council Directive 79/279 of March 5, 1979 Coordinating the Conditions for the
Admission of Securities to Official Stock Exchange Listing, 1979 OJ. (L 66) 21, amended by
Council Directive 82/148 of March 3, 1982, 1982 O.J. (L 62) 22 [hereinafter Admissions
Directive]; Council Directive 80/390 of March 17, 1980 Coordinating the Requirements for
the Drawing Up, Scrutiny and Distribution of Listing Particulars to Be Published for the
Admission of Securities to Official Stock Exchange Listing, 1980 OJ. (L 100) 1, amended by
Council Directive 90/211 of April 23, 1990, 1990 OJ. (L 112) 24, further amended by Parlia-
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tate mutual recognition of Listing Particulars and Prospectuses for pur-
poses of listing of securities by Swiss issuers on the stock exchanges of
EC member states.1 38 As Switzerland is not an EC member state, how-
ever, agreements will in principle have to be reached with each individ-
ual EC country, whereas amongst EC members, mutual recognition of
listing particulars and prospectuses will work automatically.13 9 Gener-
ally, listing will require substantial disclosure of material information
by the issuer; publication and reporting requirements, as well as con-
tinuing obligations, will be strengthened. Critics have pointed out that
the new regime might be too onerous for small and middle-sized Swiss
companies, but the SAB has clearly recognized the necessity to become
"euro-compatible" (or, rather, euro-competitive). 1 4 0
To have its securities listed, an issuer of shares or similar rights,
investment fund units or debt securities must have existed for at least
three years before making the request for admission,14 1 have the re-
quired minimum capitalization and provide the necessary reports.
Currently, minimum paid-in capital of an applicant must amount to
Sfr. 5 million. 142 In addition, the securities for which listing is re-
quested must permit the development of a market.143 The nominal
amount of the issue must presently amount to Sfr. 10 million or repre-
sent a capitalization off exchange of at least Sfr. 25 million.1 44 Addi-
tional lots of already quoted securities must amount to two million
nominally and five million of market capitalization. 145
Pursuant to the new draft rules these amounts will be increased
and replaced by the following regime: Instead of a required minimum
capital, applicants must have their own funds of at least Sfr. 25 million.
ment and Council Directive 94/18 of May 30, 1994, 1994 O.J. (L 135) 27 [hereinafter Listing
Particulars Directive 80/390].
138 The need to enter into an agreement with each member state could be obviated if
the EC were prepared to enter into an overall agreement with Switzerland. Article 25A of the
Admissions Directive expressly provides for such a possibility. SeeAdmissions Directive, supra
note 137, at art. 25A.
139 In the EC, mutual recognition has been recently facilitated, in particular additional
listings of securities listed in one EC country in other EC countries. A new Directive, EC
Directive 94/18 of May 30, 1994 even authorizes member states to provide exemptions in
whole or in part from the obligation to publish listing particulars, if the transferable securi-
ties for which listing has been applied have already been listed officially in another member
state for at least three years. Also, where the shares of a company have been traded for at
least two years on a regulated secondary market, the company may be exempted from pub-
lishing listing particulars if it seeks listing on an official, regulated exchange in the country
where its shares have already been traded on the second-tier market. See genera/ly Lambrecht,
Mutual Recognition of Listing Particulars and Prospectuses and the New Possible Exemptions, 1994
Int'l. Bus. L.J. 721.
140 See Swiss ADMISSION BOARD, Rapport Explicativ, in R-VISION DU RtGLEMENT DE COTA-
TION 2-12 (1995) [hereinafter SAB Explanatory Report].
141 SeeSAB Draft Rules, supra note 136, sec. 7; cf Admissions Directive, supra note 137, at
sched. A, Rule 3.
142 See SAB Admission Rules, art. 2.3 [hereinafter AR].
143 See id. at art. 1.
144 See id. at art. 3.1.
145 See id. at art. 3.1. (as amended 1991).
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Where the issuer is the parent of a group of companies, this require-
ment applies on a consolidated basis.' 46 New issues of shares and
other participation rights must still amount to a capitalization off ex-
change of at least Sfr. 25 million, or where similar rights of the same
issuers are already listed (such as shares of another class), Sfr. 10 mil-
lion.147 The minimum issue of ordinary debt securities is Sfr. 20 mil-
lion.148 Specific rules will be issued with respect to derivatives: Where
the underlying assets have not been issued by the issuer of the deriva-
tives, which is usually the case, one of two requirements must be met:
(i) The issue of the derivatives is Sfr. 10 million at least, 149 or (ii) the
capitalization of the underlying assets is (a) Sfr. 100 million at least in
case of debt securities as underlying assets and (b) Sfr. 50 million
where these assets are shares or other participation rights issued by a
Swiss company the securities of which are included in the Swiss Market
Index (SMI) or (c) Sfr. 25 million where the underlying assets are
shares or participation rights of a Swiss company not included in the
SMI;150 where the underlying assets are equity instruments issued by
foreign issuers, the capitalization of these securities must amount to at
least Sfr. 50 million.1 51 In case of options issued on equity, additional
lots issued by the same issuer may be listed if the capitalization meets a
minimum of Sfr. 2 million. 152 All these minimum requirements do not
apply where an earlier listed issue is simply increased later on.155 Gen-
erally, the issue of securities must allow the development of a market,
which is the reason why in case of equity instruments, at least twenty-
five percent of the issue must be offered for subscription to the public,
and where this minimum level is not reached, the issuer must make a
showing that the development of a market can nevertheless be ex-
pected.154 Where restrictions exist for the transfer of shares,1 55 listing
may be obtained where the issuer can establish that those restrictions
are not likely to cause market interruptions. 156
The most important document will be the listing particulars which
is discussed below. In addition, the issuer will have to publish a listing
advertisement containing summary information for indication of the
listing.157 The issuer will also have to make a declaration to the SAB
that no material adverse effects have occurred since the drawing up of
146 See SAB Draft Rules, supra note 136, sec. 8.
147 See id sec. 14(a).
148 See i. § 14(b).
149 See id. § 14(c)(aa).
150 See id, § 14(c)(aa)(1)-(3).
151 See id. § 14(c)(bb)(4).
152 See id. § 14(c) (bb) (4), para. 2.
153 See id. § 15.
154 See id. § 16(2).
155 See supra note 70.
156 See SAB Draft Rules, supra note 136, sec. 18(2)-(3).
157 See id §§ 49-52.
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the listing particulars and the application. The issuer will also be re-
quired to publish any material events negatively affecting its financial
position, and earnings and profits. t5 8 As registration requirements are
less complex in Switzerland than in the United States, there will be no
abridged listing procedure (so-called shelf registration).1 59
The listing particulars (prospectus) will have to be much more
detailed compared to present requirements to enable investors to
make an informed assessment not only of the issuer's financial situa-
tion, its profits and losses, its development potentials, but also of the
rights attaching to the securities to be listed, their transferability, and
any restrictions on their negotiability. 160 Thus, all information on the
issuer which may be material to an investor's decision to purchase the
security will be contained in one document. Separate rules for the list-
ing of securities by banks will exist, as will separate rules on accounting
and consolidated accounting for insurance companies. 16 1 Specific
risks will have to be disclosed separately.
Similar to the regulation in other European jurisdictions, the pro-
spectus is not a marketing document and its text will have to be
worded accordingly. Specifically, the prospectus must contain the
usual general information about the issuer and its capital162 and de-
tailed information with respect to the shares or other participation
rights, debt securities or derivatives 163 in respect of which application
158 See id. §§ 35, 56(1)(c), 58(1)(d); SAB Explanatory Report, supra note 140, at 2-8.
These rules will have to be measured, inter alia, against the comprehensive rules of the U.K.
Regulation and the Yellow Book of the London Stock Exchange. For example, where mate-
rial changes occur after listing, additional Listing Particulars must be published. See FSA,
supra note 30, secs. 142(1), 147(1)-(3). For a discussion of the U.K. rules, see Pennington,
supra note 30, secs. 7.16-7.19.
159 See SAB Explanatory Report, supra note 140, at 2-21.
160 Cf Admissions Directive, supra note 137, at art. 4. See also id at scheds. A-C (setting
out the detailed minimum requirements). References herein will be made to Schedule A
only.
161 It may be expected that the rules regardir.g the information to be provided by banks
in terms of the FBA will largely follow the patterns laid out in the FBA and the FBO, the
modified ordinance relating thereto.
162 General information about the issuer and its capital include inter alia: the amount
and class of capital with details of its principal characteristics; the amount of capital to be
paid; the authorized capital; the categories of persons having preferential subscription rights
for additional portions of capital; a description of the operations during the three preceding
years through which the capital was modified; the conditions imposed by the memorandum
and articles of association governing changes in the capital and in the respective rights of the
various classes of shares; whether such conditions are more stringent than is required by law,
in particular any restrictions on the transferability of registered shares. See AR, supra note
142, at app. I. secs. 1.1, 1.3 (SAB Draft Rules for the Issue of Prospectus in case of Issues of
Participation Rights) [hereinafter Appendix I]; Listing Particulars Directive, supra note 137,
sched. A, secs. 3.1-3.2.9.
163 There exists a specific set of rules in the form of appendices to the Admission Rules
for each category of instruments, i.e. shares and other participation rights (Appendix I), debt
securities (Appendix II) and derivatives (Appendix III). References herein are primarily
made to Appendix I Rules. The SAB rules follow insofar the classification established in the
Schedules A (shares) and B (debt securities) under the EC Listing Particulars Directive,
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for official listing is made. 164 The information on the issuer must also
comprise disclosure of major holdings (i.e. holdings greater than five
percent) 165 of individuals or legal persons, a requirement which is
likely to follow the patterns of the rules outlined above. 166 The Listing
Particulars Directive also requires disclosure of material information
on the (i) administration, management, and supervision of the issuer
(such as the remuneration paid and benefits in kind granted) during
the last completed financial year, (ii) each category or body of the
management or administration and the shares held by and the options
granted to such persons, and (iii) the nature and extent of their inter-
ests in transactions effected by the issuer during the preceding finan-
cial year. 16 7 The extent to which the SAB will require the issuers to
produce such information, which traditionally has been kept tightly as
a confidential business secret by Swiss companies, remains to be seen.
The draft rules would limit such disclosure to the total holding of re-
spective members of each category of a corporate body in the shares of
the issuer in addition to their transactions with and loans outstanding
to the issuer. 168
The listing particulars must further contain a summary of the is-
suer's principal activities and the main products sold and/or services
performed. This summary includes a breakdown of the net turnover
during the past three financial years by category of activity and geo-
graphical market, information about the location and size of its princi-
pal establishments, 169 summary information on the question of
whether the issuer is dependent on any patents or licenses, industrial
and commercial contracts or new manufacturing processes (where
which however, in contrast to the SAB rules, does not contain a particular schedule for
derivatives.
164 See Listing Particulars Directive, supra note 137, at sched. A, ch. 2 (shares) & sched. B,
ch. 2.
165 See Appendix I, supra note 162, at Rule 1.2.j(2); cf CO arts. 663c, 685d(1). The level
is thus much lower than the maximum level under the Listing Particulars Directive. See infra
note 166.
166 The Listing Particulars Directive defines a person with controlling stakes as any natu-
ral or legal persons who, directly or indirectly, severally and jointly, exercise or could exercise
control over the issuer. In this definition, joint control means control exercised by more
than one company or by more than one person having concluded an agreement which may
lead to their adopting a common policy with respect to the issuer. See. Listing Particulars
Directive, supra note 137, at sched. A, Rules 3.2.6(1) & (2). The level of control of voting
rights may be fixed as a maximum at 20% by the EC member states. See i. at Rule 3.2.7.
Finally, the Listing Particulars require a brief description of the group and the issuer's posi-
tion within it, if it is part of a group of undertakings. The issuer must also detail the number,
book value and nominal value of its own shares which it holds or which is held by another
company which it controls directly or indirectly, i.e. in which it has a direct or indirect hold-
ing of 50%, if such securities do not appear as a separate item on the balance sheet. See id. at
Rule 3.2.9. This requirement is similar to Art. 659b of the CO. CO art. 659b.
167 See Listing Particulars Directive, supra note 137, at sched. A, Rules 6.2.0 - 6.2.3.
168 See Appendix I, supra note 162, at Rule 1.8.4(a)-(c).
169 A principal establishment is any establishment which accounts for more than 10% of
the turnover of production. See Appendix I, supra note 162, at Rule 1.4.1(c); cf Listing Par-
ticulars Directive, supra note 137, at sched. A, Rule 4.1.2.
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such factors are of fundamental importance to the issuer's business or
profitability), material information on research and development of
new products in the last three financial years, and a description, with
figures, of the investment policy and interests to be acquired in other
undertakings where a firm commitment has already been made.170 Fi-
nally, detailed information must be provided on the issuer's assets and
liabilities, its financial position, profits and losses, and its recent devel-
opments and prospects. 17 1
Under both the Listing Particulars Directive and the SOAS draft
rules, specific financial data must be disclosed with respect to under-
takings in which the issuer holds, directly or indirectly, a participating
interest of ten percent.1 72 The question is whether such information
must also be disclosed up-stream, in particular where the holding in an
undertaking is not listed itself. Such information might have been vital
and saved many investors from painful experiences (such as the cases
of OMNI Holding or Maxwell). 173 However, it is most likely that no
such obligation will be issued as it might also apply to individuals. Sim-
ilar to the Listing Particulars Directive, the persons responsible for the
listing particulars and the auditing of the accounts must be indicated
in the listing particulars, and they must sign and declare that, to the
170 SeeAppendix I, supra note 162, at Rule 1.4.1 (requiring general information on type
of business, net turnover of the last two business years, major production sites and ownership
of real estate, indication of shelf areas and production sites if investing in natural resources,
indication of major obligations regarding patents, licenses, know-how or industrial or finan-
cial contracts which might affect the independence of the company); id. at Rule 1.4.2 (per-
taining to development of the business, new products and number of personnel employed
within the last three business years); id. at Rule 1.5 (investment policy in the last three busi-
ness years); cf. Listing Particulars, supra note 137, at sched. A, ch. 4.
171 SeeAppendix I, supra note 162, at Rule 1.6; cf. Listing Particulars Directive, supra note
137, at sched. A, chs. 5, 7.
172 Under the Listing Particulars Directive, the interest is determined if its book value
represents at least 10% of the capital and reserves or accounts for at least the same percent-
age of the net profits or loss of the issuer, or in case of a group, if the book value of that
interest represents at least 10% of the consolidated net assets or accounts for at least 10% of
the consolidated net profit or loss of that group. See Listing Particulars Directive, supra note
137, at sched. A, Rule 5.2. The SAB rules are less complex and apply only in the case of
unconsolidated participations the net asset value of which amounts at a minimum to 10% of
the net assets or which represent 10% of the net profits or loss of the group. SeeAppendix I,
supra note 162, at Rule 1.6(c). In addition, interests of at least 10% in the capital of other
undertakings must be disclosed if such information is material for the admission for listing.
See id.
173 See Revision Kotierungsreglement-Preliminary Report (ed. SAB, April 1994) 10-11.
OMNI Holding was a Swiss holding company built up by the Swiss investor Werner K. Rey.
While the shares of some subsidiaries were listed, the shares of the holding were not. The
conglomerate was a complex structure, which provided no transparency for investors, was
heavily financed by debt, and finally faltered and went into bankruptcy in 1991. Criminal
proceedings were initiated against Mr. Rey, who fled to the Bahamas in 1991, as a number of
the transactions effected by and on behalf of the group appeared to be of doubtful legality.
A large number of investors suffered losses in the hundreds of millions of Swiss francs. The
Maxwell empire was a similarly complex and secretively built up conglomerate with the ulti-
mate owner, Mr Maxwell, not being subject to such reporting requirements. Mr Maxwell
died on his yacht, apparently through suicide, and left behind him a heap of debt, jobless
employees and penniless investors.
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best of their knowledge, the information for which they are responsi-
ble is in accordance with the facts and contains no material
omissions. 174
V. Investment Fund Law
A. In General
The Swiss investment fund industry has been hampered by an out-
dated and rigid investment fund act and Swiss stamp tax legislation,'175
which was the reason why Swiss banks began to move to incorporate
their funds in Luxembourg, as it does not levy stamp taxes on the issue
of units or on the turnover of securities. Stamp taxes on the issue of
units have now been abolished, but fund managers still qualify as trad-
ers for purposes of transfer taxes. Moreover, distribution to unit hold-
ers are subject to a thirty-five percent withholding tax, but
withholdings may be substantially reduced under double tax treaties, if
applicable. ' 76
The new Investment Fund Act (IFA) is designed to remedy the
regulatory situation. 177 Its purpose is the protection of investors.178
This goal is no longer to be achieved through rigid and narrow invest-
ment restrictions as under the old act, but rather, through increased
market transparency to permit investors to make an informed decision
on their investments. Transparency shall be established mainly
through the imposition of reporting and publication requirements
and the obligation to issue a prospectus.' 79 Risk warnings in the pro-
spectus and other marketing documents shall work as red lights for
investors.180 Investor protection shall also be guaranteed by requiring
adequate fund organization and professional qualification of fund
managers,' 18 rules on conflict of interest, and the requirement of inde-
174 Such declaration does not by itself create a liability, since such liability is already
instituted by Art. 1156(3) of the CO. See CO art. 1156(3). Nevertheless, the declaration may
engender a shift of the burden of proof, where a breach of the obligation of due care and
diligence as well as the causation between such violation and the loss have been established.
175 Luxembourg funds managed by Swiss banks amount to more than Sfr. 160 bn, but
the assets held by Swiss funds amount only to approx. 60 bn. See IFA Explanatory Report,
supra note 5, at 265-67; Spinnler, Das neue schweierische Anlagefondsgesetz und das europdische
Investmentgechdft, 1994 Pratique Juridique Actuelle (PJA) 284.
176 Switzerland has entered into treaties with a large number of countries, including the
United States to avoid or reduce double taxation. For an extensive overview of the treaties in
force, see Administration FWdrale des Contributions, Droit Fiscal International de la Suisse,
Part 1 (1993).
177 For example, the very narrow and technical definition of investments in the old Act
(Art. 6) did not permit issuance of money market instruments. See Spinnler, supra note 175.
at 285.
178 See IFA, supra note 5, at art. 1; IFA Explanatory Report, supra note 5, at 232.
179 See IFA, supra note 5, at arts. 47 - 51.
180 See IFA, supra note 5, at art. 35(6); Ordinance I, supra note 23, at art. 45 (pertaining
to the category of "other funds").
181 See IFA, supra note 5, at arts. 9(4)-(5), 10; Ordinance I, supra note 23, at arts. 12-13.
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pendence between fund managers 8 2 and custodian banks.18 Fund
managers, custodian banks, professional distributors, and auditors will
all need special licenses from the FBC, 184 which will continue to act as
supervisory authority as under present law. 185 Any of these functiona-
ries, the same as any distributor, representative of a foreign fund, audi-
tor, or valuation expert, is subject to civil liability for any damage which
he caused to an investor by violation of one of his duties, unless he can
make a showing of absence of negligence or fault. 186
The IFA defines an investment fund (fund) as an undertaking
that has the sole purpose of collectively investing capital raised
through public solicitation and managed by the fund management for
the account of the investors ordinarily on the principle of risk-spread-
ing.187 Public solicitation is any marketing which is not limited to a
narrowly defined circle of persons. The legislature did not fix a specific
number of persons for this purpose as is the case in other jurisdic-
tions.188 Thus, even marketing to an existing clientele may, in certain
circumstances, be deemed to be public solicitation in terms of the
Act.189 In contrast to the EC UCITS Directive, 9 ° the IFA only applies
182 See IFA, supra note 5, at art. 9(6) (independence); id. at arts. 10(2), 12; Ordinance I,
supra note 23, at art. 14 (duty of loyalty & avoidance of conflicts of interest: no commissions
or retro-cession of commissions other than those provided by investment regulations; trans-
actions on own behalf with fund, directly or through affiliates, exclusively on basis of market
prices); id. at art. 13 (disclosure of interests or major holdings in fund manager).
183 See IFA, supra note 5, at art. 20(1) (duty of loyalty towards investors); id. at art. 20(2)
(due diligence and avoidance of conflict of interests: no commissions or retro-cession of
commissions other than those provided by investment regulations; transactions on own be-
half with fund, directly or through affiliates, exclusively on basis of market prices).
184 See generally IFA, supra note 5, at art. 10(1) (fund manager); id. at art. 18 (custodian);
id. at art. 22 (distributor); id. at art. 52 (auditors).
185 See id. at art. 56.
186 These persons are also fully liable for their agents, representatives or contractors, to
whom they have entrusted the performance of their duties wholly or in part. Any limitation
of such liability towards the investors is invalid. See IFA, supra note 5, at art. 65.
187 See IFA, supra note 5, at art. 2(1). The element of risk-spreading had given rise to
some confusion and over-extensive application of the existing act. See, e.g., ATF 98 Ib 42, ATF
110 II 74 (decisions of the Swiss Federal Tribunal pertaining to the element of risk-spread-
ing). The requirement is, therefore, no longer a necessary element of the technical fund
definition. See IFA Explanatory Report, supra note 5, at 232-33.
188 See also, e.g., FSA, supra note 30, sec. 76(1)-(3) (prohibiting promotion of collective
investment scheme, unless it is an authorized trust or recognized scheme, see Financial Serv-
ices (Authorized Unit Trust Scheme) Regulations 1988); see also The Financial Services 1986
(Investment Advertisements) (Exemptions) Order 1988 (SI 1988/316) and subsequent or-
ders 1990 (SI 1990/27), 1992 (SI 1992/274 & 813) (issued by the SIB pursuant to its powers
under sec. 76 of the FSA).
189 See IFA, supra note 5, at art. 2(2). This will depend on the nature and quality as well
as the number of clients. If a large bank sent out marketing materials to thousands of its
clients, such marketing would, of course, be considered a public solicitation. There also
exists a rule of thumb as to which marketing to fewer than twenty persons will not be deemed
a public solicitation. See IFA Explanatory Report, supra note 5, at 233. However, the IFA
itself does not impose such limitation. Depending on the particular circumstances of a case,
a much greater number of persons might be contacted without such activity being consid-
ered a public solicitation.
190 SeeArt. 1(2) Council Directive 85/611 of December 20, 1985 on the Co-ordination of
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to funds constituted in contractual form (i.e. on the basis of collective
investment contract). 19 ' Thus, funds cannot be constituted as trusts,
companies, or limited partnerships. The incorporation of mere invest-
ment companies is, however, still permitted and such companies are
not regulated under the IFA,19 2 but such undertakings must not be
labeled as or be advertised or marketed under terms like "investment
fund" or similar denominations which might give rise to confusion
with funds. 193
The Government may, in addition, extend the IFA or some of its
provisions to fund-like undertakings, or it may exempt certain under-
takings from the Act wholly or in part where the purpose of investor
protection does not require regulation. 194 In particular, it may apply
certain provisions of the Act to internal collective portfolios of banks
that, as such, are exempted from the Act.195 The Ordinance I also
extends the Act to so-called master-feeder constructions. 19 6 Given the
fund's contractual form, its assets are owned by the fund manager in a
fiduciary capacity on behalf of the investors. The assets must, there-
fore, be kept separate. By operation of law, they remain outside the
fund manager's estate in case of his bankruptcy. 197
Any collective investment contract must provide for redemption
Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to Undertakings for Collective In-
vestments in Transferable Securities (UCITS), art. 1(2), 1985 O.J. (L 375/3) 1, amended ty
Council Directive 88/220 of March 22, 1988, 1988 O.J. (L 100/31). A Council proposal for a
further amendment, which will extend the range of permitted investments, is expected to
come into force this year. See Council Proposal for a Council Directive Amending Directive
375/3 on the Co-ordination of Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to
Undertakings for Collective Investments in Transferable Securities, art. 1(2), 1993 O.J. (C
59) 14. [hereinafter UCITS Directive].
191 See IFA, supra note 5, at arts. 3(1), 6.
192 For example, simple shareholding companies (SA, AG) the purpose of which is in-
vestment in securities, are not regulated by the IFA. Under Swiss law, the shareholder has no
right to have his share redeemed, i.e. the SA or AG is closed-ended, and thus not subject to
the IFA. For a comparison see, e.g., Den Otter, Anlegerschutz aufKosten der Aktiondrsrechte, in
Neue Zuercher Zeitung, No. 25, Jan. 31, 1995, at B.10 (special issue on investment funds).
193 The Federal Tribunal had upheld the FBC's extensive application of the old Act. See
ATF 107 Ib 358. The limitation to contractual undertakings was, therefore, expressly spelled
out in the new IFA. For a discussion of the prohibition to use the fund label, see IFA, supra
note 5, at art 5; IFA Explanatory Report, supra note 5, at 207, 234.
194 See IFA, supra note 5, at art. 3(4).
195 See IFA, supra note 5, at art. 4; Ordinance I, supra note 23, at art. 3 (setting out
specific requirements for internal collective portfolios).
196 See Ordinance I, supra note 23, at art. 2(1). Master-feeder constructions, or in the
name of its inventors and trademark owners, "hub-and-spoke" funds, work as follows: A
number of banks or open-ended management companies (the "Feeders" or the "Spokes")
collect monies from individual investors for the purpose of investment. The "spoke" then
fully invests those monies in another open-ended mangement company (the "Master" or
"Hub"). Shares of the "spoke" are sold to the public, but the shares of the "hub" are offered
only to the one or several spokes. The investment activity takes place at the hub-level only.
In the United States, this structure was used because it permitted use of different classes of
shares for investing indirectly in a single portfolio of securities, a feature which was prohib-
ited under the U.S. Investment Company Act. See Carr, Adapting to a Thriving Market, INT'L
FIN. L. REv. 3 (Special Supp. 1992).
197 See IFA, supra note 5, at art. 16.
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of the units upon request by the investor. Hence, the IFA does not
provide for closed-ended schemes.198 The Government may grant ex-
emptions from the closed-end requirement for certain categories of
funds which consist of investments that may be illiquid or difficult to
appraise. According to the Ordinance I, redemption may be restricted
for such fund categories to four dealing days per year and, in particu-
lar cases, be restricted in time. 199 Redemption may be suspended in
either exceptional cases, such as disruption or suspension of dealing in
the securities in which the fund invests, or cases of extraordinary polit-
ical, military, or economic occurrences in the countries where the
fund invests necessitating such suspension.200
A fund- must have a fund management (manager), a custodian
bank, and auditors, which all must be licensed by the FBC. The man-
ager must be a shareholding company incorporated in Switzerland,
whose purpose must be exclusively the management of funds. 20' The
IFA and the Ordinance I provide various requirements as to minimum
initial capital and capital adequacy,202 and disclosure and reporting.20 3
The manager must establish regulations regarding the management of
the fund's assets. These regulations, which represent the actual char-
ter of the fund, also set out the rights and obligations of investors, the
custodian, and the manager.20 4 Specific qualifications are required for
managers of high risk funds.20 5 The manager must issue a prospectus
for each of its funds, keep separate books and accounts, and issue and
198 See IFA, supra note 5, at art. 24(1); cf UCITS Directive, supra note 190, at art. 37(1).
A scheme is generally said to be closed-ended if the investor has no right to have his shares
redeemed by the scheme or its affiliates upon his request. See Herbert, Jersey, INT'L FIN. L.
REv. 47 (Special Supp. 1992) (report on Jersey investment fund laws).
199 See IFA, supra note 5, at art. 24(2)-(3); Ordinance I, supra note 23, at art. 25.
200 See Ordinance I, supra note 23, at art. 26; cf UCITS Directive, supra note 190, at art.
37(2) (a)-(b).
201 See IFA, supra note 5, at art. 9(1); cf UCITS Directive, supra note 190, at art. 6.
202 See IFA, supra note 5, at arts. 9, 10, 13. According to the Ordinance, minimum capital
is Sfr. 1 million. See Ordinance I, supra note 23, at art. 11. The manager's own funds must be
equivalent to (i) 1% of the Fund's managed net asset value (NAV) not exceeding Sfr. 100
million, (ii) 0.75% of the NAV exceeding 100, but less than 500 million, and (iii) 0.50% of
the NAV exceeding Sfr. 500 million. In no case do the manager's own assets have to be
higher than Sfr. 10 million. Id. at arts. 15, 16; cf. FBO, supra note 16, at arts. 11, 12; UCITS
Directive, supra note 190, at art. 5.
203 See IFA, supra note 5, at art. 10. According to Ordinance I, the board of directors
must consist of at least three members. See Ordinance I, supra note 23, at art. 12. The names
and addresses of the members of the board and the management must be reported to the
FBC. Similarly, the manager must disclose to the FBC the particulars of any individual or
legal person who controls, directly or indirectly, 10% of either the capital or voting tights of
the manager or who otherwise has a material influence on its business. The disclosure obli-
gations extend to persons who are economically affiliated and together control such percent-
age of the capital or voting rights. Id. at art. 13; cf. UCITS Directive, supra note 190, at art.
4(3).
204 See IFA, supra note 5, at arts. 7-8. For a Fund of funds, only one set of regulations will
have to be drawn. See Ordinance I, supra note 23, at art. 8.
205 These qualifications of managers apply to the category of "other funds." See infra
note 222 and accompanying text.
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publish the annual reports, accounts, and the unit prices on a regular
basis. 206 It should be noted that only the fund regulations need FBC
approval, not the prospectus, which must nevertheless be submitted to
the supervisory authority.207
The custodian must be a bank in terms of the FBA. Its responsibil-
ities include safe-keeping the assets (which it may hold within or
outside Switzerland), controlling and making payments on behalf of
the fund, issuing and redeeming units, and generally controlling the
manager's investment decisions, its calculation of the net asset value,
and its application of the fund's benefits. 20 8 The managing directors
of the manager and the custodian must each be independent from the
other company. 209 The Auditors must be specially qualified and ap-
proved by the FBC.210 Professional Distributors of units will also need
authorization from the FBC. Unlike under the old IFA, Distributors
need no longer be banks in terms of the FBA.211 Pursuant to its spe-
cial powers under Articles 43(2) and 53(4) of the IFA and Article
62(1) of the Ordinance I, the FBC has issued its own Ordiance (FBC
Ordinance) which deals in detail with internal accounting standards
and auditing and reporting by the auditors. It also contains detailed
regulations on the use of derivatives and securities lending by UCITS
and securities lending by other funds. 212
The IFA introduces three fund categories: (1) undertakings for
206 See IFA, supra note 5, at arts. 47-51; Ordinance I, supra note 23, at arts. 62-83. For a
discussion of detailed internal accounting and auditing requirements and standards, see FBO,
supra note 16, at arts. 26-49.
207 See IFA, supra note 5, at arts. 7(1), 50(3); cf. UCITS Directive, supra note 190, at art.
32. The prospectus must meet the standards of EC regulations. See IFA, supra note 5, at art.
50(2); cf UCITS Directive, supra note 190, at arts. 27-33. The FBC retains the power to
intervene and to require modifications of the prospectus on the basis of its general supervi-
sory powers if the prospectus does not conform with IFA requirements. See IFA Explanatory
Report, supra note 5, at 251. In addition, the manager will be subject to civil liability if the
prospectus contains material false information or material omissions. See IFA, supra note 5, at
art. 65.
208 See IFA, supra note 5, at arts. 17-20; cf UCTS Directive, supra note 190, at arts. 7, 14.
Where assets of the fund are placed with a third party in Switzerland or abroad, the name of
such party must appear in the prospectus. See IFA Explanatory Report, supra note 5, at 239-
40.
209 See IFA, supra note 5, at art. 9(6); cf UCITS Directive, supra note 190, at art. 10 (stat-
ing the requirement of independence more clearly).
210 See IFA, supra note 5, at art. 52. The auditors are bound by professional secrecy and
may not inform the investors or even third parties about their activity and internal matters of
the Fund or its manager. See IFA, supra note 5, at art. 54.
211 See IFA, supra note 5, at art. 22. The applicant may be an individual or a legal person.
He must have several years of investment experience, be of good standing and provide for
sufficient professional insurance coverage. There must exist a marketing or distributor
agreement, set out in writing, among the manager, the custodian and the distributor. See
Ordinance I, supra note 23, at art. 22(1)(f). The FBC may condition licensing of the appli-
cant complying with the guidelines issued by the self-regulatory bodies of the industry. Id. at
art. 22(3). Banks, as defined by the FBA, and insurance companies, as defined by the Federal
Act on Supervision of Insurance Companies of June 23, 1978, RS 961.01, need no such li-
cense. Id. at art. 23.
212 See FBC Ordinance, supra note 24, at arts. 1-11 (derivatives, in particular options and
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collective investments in transferable securities listed on an exchange
or traded on another regular market place; (ii) real estate funds; and
(iii) other funds. The first category comprises UCITS in terms of the
EC Directive. The Swiss authorities borrowed from EC legislation with
respect to the type of permitted investments, investment restrictions,
and risk-spreading so as to facilitate the marketing of such funds in EC
countries on a reciprocal basis.2 13 The permitted type of investments
and the investment restrictions of this category of Funds are therefore
equivalent to those applicable to UCITS.2 1 4
Real estate funds must directly invest in real estate. A real estate
fund may only invest in real estate companies if it controls at least two-
thirds of its capital or its voting rights. 21 5 The investors' community
has frequently criticized the management of real estate funds, in par-
ticular with respect to the valuation and watering-down of the value of
the units of existing unit holders upon new issues.21 6 The IFA at-
tempts to remedy at least some of these shortcomings through more
detailed regulations on valuation, specifically by requiring funds to
nominate an independent valuation board,2 17 granting preference
rights to existing unit holders upon the issue of new units, 2 18 and re-
quiring the fund to hold sufficient liquidity for purposes of redemp-
tion.2 1 9 In contrast, the unit holders' redemption rights will be
restricted, given the fact that the fund's assets are placed in long-term
investments which are financed short-term. Thus, redemption will
only be possible at the end of the fund's financial year, upon twelve
futures); id. at arts. 12-24 (securities lending). The rules relating to securities lending issued
for UCITS apply by analogy to "other funds." See id at art. 25.
213 See IFA, supra note 5, at arts. 32, 43(3) IFA; IFA Explanatory Report, supra note 5, at
220-22.
214 See UCITS Directive, supra note 190, at arts. 19, 22, 23, 25 (the Swiss legislature has
anticipated that the Council proposals of February 10, 1993 will become effective).
215 See IFA, supra note 5, at art. 36(1)(b).
216 The FBC had to intervene in a number of cases in the 1980s where the valuation of
assets had been below market values. See Neue Zuercher Zeitung, No. 25, Jan. 31, 1995, at
B.10 (special issue on investment funds). If pew units had been issued on the basis of such
unfair valuation, the value of the units of existing investors would be watered down. See Den
Otter, Das Bundesgesetz ueber den Anlagefonds, in Schweiz, Juristische Kartothek (SJK), No.
1309, at 10.
217 See IFA, supra note 5, at art. 39; Ordinance I, supra note 23, at art. 50.
218 See IFA, supra note 5, at art. 41(1).
219 See IFA, supra note 5, at art. 36(4); Ordinance I, supra note 23, at art. 48. Investment
is restricted to real estate situated in Switzerland, housing and office buildings, as well as debt
instruments directly secured by Swiss real estate for up to 10% of the net asset value. See IFA,
supra note 5, at art. 36(1); Ordinance I, supra note 23, at art. 46(1) (a)-(e). Investment in real
estate abroad, housing or office buildings, is permitted if valuation equivalent to Swiss stan-
dards is guaranteed. See Ordinance I, supra note 23, at art. 46(3). There are various restric-
tions relating to the type of property in which the Fund may invest as well as limits to insure
risk spreading. For example, the Fund must invest in at least ten different parcels of land,
and investment in one parcel may not exceed more than 25% of its net assets. See generally
Ordinance I, supra note 23, at arts. 46(5), 47-48 Ordinance I. For a discussion of the issue of
valuation, see also 25 FBC Bulletin 34 (1994) (FBC decision).
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months notice by the investor. 220 This provision has already been
heavily criticized because such investments may prove to be illiquid
where the units are not listed and/or where no real market exists for
them. 221
The category of "other funds" includes all other types of funds, in
particular those which present increased business risks for investors.
The objective of such funds may be the investment in less liquid securi-
ties and/or assets, the value of which may be difficult to appraise. The
units of such funds are usually subject to greater volatility than those of
UCITS. Hence, the category includes funds whose principle objective
is investment in precious metals, commodities, futures and options,
other derivatives, unquoted securities, and hedge funds.222 The man-
agement of such funds must be particularly qualified.223 The prospec-
tus, which as such is not subject to FBC approval, must contain specific
risk warnings which must be approved by the FBC and figure in any
marketing material. 224 According to Ordinance I, these funds may in-
vest in (i) any securities, money market instruments, bank deposits, or
units of other funds without being subject to the restrictions applicable
to UCITS;225 (ii) futures and options traded on an exchange or other
regular market open to the public and any other type of standardized
derivatives;2 26 (iii) foreign exchange deals and forex swaps;227 (iv) any
standardized futures and options contracts on commodities, if they are
traded on an exchange or other regular market open to the public;2 28
and (v) precious metals or any derivatives on such assets traded on an
220 See IFA, supra note 5, at art. 41 IFA; IFA Explanatory Report, supra note 5, at 223-24.
221 Investors will now have to wait for one year to get their money back without knowing
at what price. Prices of existing real estate funds, therefore, have plummeted by 15% since
the IFA became effective. Even where the units are listed, there is rarely a sufficient market
in them since custodian banks and brokers are not eager to hold these investments on stock
given their illiquidity. Furthermore, the spread between issue and redemption prices has
considerably widened. As a consequence, two real estate funds have already been wound-up
since the adoption of the IFA. A number of bankers, therefore, have called for an amend-
ment of the new Act. See CASH, No.11, Mar. 17, 1995, at 89.
222 See IFA, supra note 5, at art. 35(1)-(2). According to the Explanatory Report, certain
types of investments would not be permitted where valuation would be too complex, or
rather, in the author's view, where too much depends on individual appreciation, such as
investments in antiques, art, stamps or other objects of collection. See IFA Explanatory Re-
port, supra note 5, at 245.
223 At least two directors must have a minimum professional experience of five years in
the management of investment as contemplated under the Fund. Delegation of Fund man-
agement is permitted if the persons to whom such power is delegated have at least the same
minimum experience. The FBC may then waive these requirements with respect to the Fund
directors. See Ordinance I, supra note 23, at art. 44.
224 See id. at art. 45.
225 See id. at art. 43(1)(a).
226 The underlying investments may be securities, commodities or precious metals; they
may also be based on indices or reference indices (interest indices, currencies). See id at art.
43(1) (c).
227 See id. at art. 43(1)(d).
228 See id. at art. 43(1)(c).
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exchange or another regular market open to the public. 22 9 With re-
spect to investment restrictions, the following principle applies: These
funds may hold as much liquidity as their objectives require.230 The
borrowing limit is ordinarily twenty-five percent of the net asset value..
The FBC may waive that threshold where the fund seeks to leverage its
assets. 23 1 If a fund wishes to effect short sales, detailed provisions must
be contained in the investment regulations. The FBO may impose lim-
itations where it deems necessary.232 As is true for any other fund cate-
gory, the fund may never issue units as consideration for the purchase
of assets. 233 Detailed regulations also exist with respect to securities
lending which have been issued for UCITS, but which apply by analogy
to other funds.23 4 All securities lending must by undertaken through
the Custodian bank who may act as principal or agent. Counterparties
must be first-class addresses. 23 5 Depending on the lending period and
the type of assets, it is limited to fifty percent, but may go up to 100%
of any specific, asset type depending on the duration of the lending
period (usually' short term) and the applicable notice period for termi-
nation of the lending contract. 236
Given the very broad rule-making and supervisory powers of the
FBC in this area, the IFA's success in strengthening the Swiss fund in-
dustry will depend to a large extent on the manner in which it will be
applied and implemented by the FBC, which has pursued rather con-
servative policies in the past.
B. Marketing of Foreign Investment Fund Units
The IFA also applies to all foreign investment schemes whose
units are publicly marketed in Switzerland, irrespective of their legal
form. 237 No public solicitation is permitted without FBC authoriza-
tion,238 which will be granted if the foreign scheme (i) is a foreign
investment fund (Foreign fund) in terms of the IFA, (ii) is subject to
adequate supervision in its home country,239 and (iii) has an organiza-
229 See id. at art. 43(1)(b).
230 See id. at art. 25(1).
231 See ia. at art. 25(2).
232 See i& at art. 42(4).
233 See IFA, supra note 5, at art. 31.
234 See FBO, supra note 16, at art. 25.
235 See id. at arts. 13-14.
236 See id at arts. 16-18.
237 See IFA, supra note 5, at arts. 2(1), 3(3), 45. According to FBC statistics, there were
566 foreign Funds publicly promoted in Switzerland of which 54 were domiciled in ajurisdic-
tion with no comparable supervision. See 1993 FBC Ann. Rep. 90.
238 See IFA, supra note 5, at art. 45(1); IFA Explanatory Report, supra note 5, at 225-26.
239 Funds incorporated, inter alia, on the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands (de-
spite the new Cayman Island Mutual Fund Law, effective July 26, 1993) cannot be publicly
marketed anymore, but, in the author's view, if correctly structured and adequate safeguards
against public marketing are truly undertaken, they may still be sold to a predefined and
limited number of investors in Switzerland. Foreign fund managers may wish to seek a deci-
sion on this issue from the Federal Banking Commission.
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tion and investment policy equivalent to the IFA's provisions relating
to investor protection. 240 "Foreign funds" are defined as (i) collective
investment undertakings constituted in contractual form24 1 or (ii) in-
vestment companies the units of which are redeemed either by the
scheme or an affiliate upon the investor's request. 242 Consequently,
closed-ended schemes do not qualify as foreign funds. Hence, such
schemes are not regulated under the IFA, but the Act also includes a
provision prohibiting marketing of such (domestic or foreign)
schemes as "investment funds," "fonds de placement," "Anlagefonds,"
"Investment Trust" or any similar labels which might give rise to confu-
sion with funds or foreign funds in terms of and licensed under the
IFA.2 43 However, if such an undertaking is (i) deemed to be an invest-
ment fund according to the laws of the state of its incorporation or
origin, (ii) is subject to adequate supervision in that jurisdiction, and
(iii) the scheme and its units or shares are not marketed as fund or any
other name or label which again might give rise to confusion with
funds or foreign funds in terms of and licensed under the IFA, its units
or shares may also be publicly marketed and the scheme as such is
subject to the Act's provisions relating to public marketing.2 44 In con-
trast, units of any undertaking may not be publicly marketed in Swit-
zerland if the undertaking is not subject to adequate home country
supervision.245 To facilitate cross-country marketing of Swiss and for-
eign funds similar to the UCITS Directive, the Government may enter
into reciprocal agreements with other countries.246 Foreign funds
domiciled in such jurisdictions need no marketing authorization and
must merely inform the FBC of their intention to market and dis-
tribute units in Switzerland.2 47 Finally, foreign schemes which are not
subject to home country supervision, but which have been licensed
prior to December 31, 1991, are automatically grandfathered. 248
240 See IFA, supra note 5, at arts. 44(1), 45(2). For a discussion of the documents which
must be submitted with the application, see Ordinance I, supra note 23, at art. 55 (borrowing
from UcITS Directive, supra note 190, at art. 46). See also Ordinance I, supra note 23, at art.
61; UCITS Directive, supra note 190, at art. 47 (relating to reporting requirements and con-
tinuing obligations).
241 These are collective undertakings in terms of Art. 6 of the IFA. See IFA, supra note 5,
at art. 6.
242 See IFA, supra note 5, at art. 44(1)(b).
243 See IFA, supra note 5, at art. 5.
244 This follows from the general regime applicable to Swiss Funds. See also IFA Explana-
tory Report, supra note 5, at 225, 248. The FBC may require that explanatory particulars be
added to the name of the foreign scheme where it might give rise to confusion or deception.
See Ordinance I, supra note 23, at art. 59 Ordinance; UCITS Directive, supra note 190, at art.
48.
245 See IFA Explanatory Report, supra note 5, at 225, 249.
246 See IFA, supra note 5, at art. 45(5).
247 See IFA Explanatory Report, supra note 5, at 249.
248 See IFA, supra note 5, at art. 45(6). Any marketing document must indicate that the
Fund is not subject to adequate home country supervision. See Ordinance 1, supra note 23, at
art. 60.
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VI. Conclusion
Important regulatory and market developments have occurred or
will occur in 1995 on the Swiss capital markets. The new Securities
Exchange Act will for the first time provide for federal regulation of
stock exchanges and broker-dealers in Switzerland. On the market
side, the introduction of the Swiss electronic exchange will substan-
tially change the manner in which the trades are effected. With the
introduction of the SEA, for the first time a distinction is made in Swit-
zerland between capital market law applicable to companies as a body
of law distinguished and separate from ordinary company law. It also
includes regulations on the disclosure of major holdings similiar to EC
legislation. While the Swiss legislature has developed a tendency to
adopt legislation similar to EC law, it has gone further than the EC and
has introduced specific provisions on takeovers of listed companies,
including an obligation to make a bid to take over all shares outstand-
ing on the market upon exceeding certain thresholds. These new pro-
visions will likely improve the interests of the investors and, by the
same token, fairness on and the quality and attractivity of the Swiss
capital markets which have for a long time been less transparent than
their English or U.S. peers. The Swiss legislature has also recognized
that the investor is best protected if he is enabled to take an informed
investment decision. For that purpose, he must be given the possibility
to access market information freely. The free flow of information shall
now be facilitated through improved disclosure, reporting and publica-
tion requirements applicable to broker-dealers and specifically listed
companies and offerors in takeover battles.
The same rationales apply with respect to the new Investment
Fund Act. The legislature recognized that the investor is best protected
by enabling him to make a fully informed investment decision rather
than through rigid investment regulations, which also hampered the
development of the Swiss investment fund industry. Overall, Switzer-
land has introduced modern regulatory instruments which should per-
mit investors to follow market developments more easily and provide
more fairness for investors on the capital markets. The new laws should
also facilitate the Swiss market participants to compete with other im-
portant capital markets in Europe and elsewhere.
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